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I. Introduction
We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of War
used by publicists.'
One of the central challenges confronting international relations
today is that we do not really know what is a war and what is
not. The consequences of our confusion would seem absurd,
were they not so profoundly dangerous.2
If one asks what may cause war, the simple answer is
'anything.' 3
Regions with large Muslim populations in the Middle East,
Asia, and Africa are no strangers to conflict and warfare, including
protracted strife.' Yet, remarkably few datasets have focused on
Muslim states in their conflict behavior, and even fewer studies in
the now expansive field of quantitative conflict research have
examined the role of state compliance with the international law
regulating armed conflict (international humanitarian law) as a
variable in such conflict behavior. The slim inquiry on Muslim
state conflict and compliance behavior contrasts with otherwise
intensive study of closely related subjects: political violence in
Muslim societies, democracy deficits in the Arab world, political
Islam and stability, Arab resource and development dynamics,
ethnic identity and religion in civil war, and so forth.
Addressing this paradox raises intriguing questions at the
I CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, On War, in THREE VOLUMES 1, 1-2 (1918).
2 Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls' College,
Oxford, The Changing Character of War: A European Lecture Delivered at the Graduate
Inst. of Int'l Relations 2 (Nov. 9, 2006).
3 Kenneth Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, 25 INT'L SEC. 5, 8 (2000).
4 Monica Duffy Toft, Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil
War, 31 INT'L SEC. 97 (2007); see Jonathan Fox, Are Middle East Conflicts More
Religious?, MIDDLE EAST Q. 31 (Oct. 2014) (explaining how conflict in Muslim
populated countries tend to be more religiously charged); MOHAMMED M. HAFEZ, WHY
MUSLIMS REBEL: REPRESSION AND RESISTANCE IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD (2003); see also
Andrej Tusicisny, Civilizational Conflicts: More Frequent, Longer, and Bloodier?, 41 J.
PEACE RES. 485 (2004) (discussing the higher likelihood of escalation of conflicts among
different civilizations than conflicts within a single civilization).
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intersection of international relations, public international law, and
security studies, and injects an empirical baseline for assessing
now commonplace claims that Muslim-dominated areas
disproportionately experience conflict, political violence,
lawlessness, and instability. Recent political upheavals in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have only increased
the need to examine such patterns rigorously and in ways that add
emergent variables-such as law and compliance-to the existing
literature.5 Likewise, cross-national inquiry on Muslim inter- and
intra-state conflict dynamics may help to identify important related
developments, such as the effects of compliance on post conflict
stability and the rise of irregular armed groups with a Muslim state
locus (i.e., as a safe haven, conflict zone, or training site).'
Toward these ends, the article introduces a new Muslim State
Armed Conflict & Compliance (MSACC) dataset 7 that provides an
overview of modern armed conflict and international law
compliance behavior for all Muslim states from 1947-2014.' The
5 See Int'l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA], An Energy-Rich
Region of Increasingly Energized Citizens: The Interplay Between Democracy, Politics,
and Energy in the Shadow of Political Upheaval in the MENA Region (June 28, 2012)
(ONS Summit) (discussing the political and economic reform MENA region is recently
undergoing due to issues involving armed conflict and democracy).
6 Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, Civil War, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3
(2010) (explaining in abstract that cross-national studies will benefit our understanding
of war and its causes).
7 C. Zoli, E. Schneider & C. Schuster, Muslim State Armed Conflict & Compliance
Dataset (MSACC) 1947-2014, 2012, Distributed by Syracuse University, Institute for
National Security & Counterterrorism (INSCT), College of Law/Maxwell School of
Public Affairs, http://insct.syr.edu/projects/security-in-the-middle-east-islam/conflict-
compliance-in-muslim-states/.
8 We define "Muslim state" by membership in the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), the intergovernmental organization of 57 members, including
Palestine, with permanent U.N. delegation status (we exclude Palestine as it is not
recognized by the U.N. as a state). See Member States, ORG. OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION,
http://www.oicun.org/3/28/#nogo (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) [hereinafter OIC Member
States] (enumerating member OIC states). State membership in the OIC is fluid so we
determined membership as of 2010, when we began our research. Since then, Bosnia
was added to the OIC in April 2013 and Syria was suspended in August 2012.
Established in 1969, OIC defines itself as "the collective voice of the Muslim world"
designed to "safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of
promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world." We
use this framework for two reasons. First, OIC member states are inclusive of the
traditional 47 Muslim population-majority states in which the population is at least 50.1
percent Muslim-with the exception of Muslim-majority state Kosovo, which is not an
OIC member. In addition to the traditional 47 Muslim-majority states (minus Kosovo),
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MSACC dataset tracks each modem Muslim state, defined by
voluntary state membership in the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC),' in both its armed conflict history and
compliance record with international humanitarian law (IHL), and
the universal international regime governing conduct of hostilities
during armed conflict.o The dataset encompasses all international
(IAC) and non-international (NIAC) armed conflicts as defined by
IHL in which a Muslim state acts as a major belligerent party."
In using an IHL-based definition of armed conflict, the dataset
is distinctive in several ways. First, it relies upon a legal, instead
of a political-sociological (i.e., battle deaths) framework for
understanding and defining armed conflict. Second, it
disaggregates the complex contemporary conflict spectrum into
two streamlined types, international and non-international
conflicts, as required by respective threshold triggers under IHL.
Third, it focuses holistically on self-identified Muslim states in
their actual conflict and compliance behavior, rather than on
we include the additional II OIC countries without a simple Muslim-majority
population, largely in Africa: Benin, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Mozambique, Nigeria, Suriname, Togo, and Uganda. Notably, countries with
sizeable Muslim populations, India, China, and Russia (though Russia is an OIC
observer state since 2005) are not members of OIC, either because they have been
blocked (India), or do not see the benefits of identifying as a "Muslim state" for purposes
of national identity or intraregional politics. Second, we use this more expansive
definition of "Muslim state" to take into account state's self-identification, as all OIC
member states adopt a Muslim state identity, whether for religious, sociocultural,
national, economic, and/or policy reasons, including regional balance of power issues.
OIC has thus come to project, as per OIC Charter Article II(a)(b), a regional policy
agenda expressly affiliated with Muslim states and Muslim notions of governance,
particularly for the audience of the international community. This policy projection
creates some sense of common purpose among diverse OIC member states, with respect
to regional and international issues. See Gairuzazmi Ghani, Does OIC Membership
Reduce Trade?, 28 J. EcoN. COOPERATION 39, 41-43 (2007) (discussing the background
of Muslim-states and incidences of conflict); PEW RES. CENTER'S F. ON RELIGION & PUB.
LIFE, http://www.pewforum.org/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2013).
9 OIC Member States, supra note 8 (listing the fifty seven member states of OIC).
10 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], INCREASING RESPECT FOR
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (Feb.
2008), available at https://www.icrc.oig/englassets/files/other/icrc_002_0923.pdf.
II See generally Rule ofLaw in Armed Conflicts Project, GENEVA ACADEMY INT'L
HUMANITARIAN L. & HUM. RTs., http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/ (last visited
Oct. 16, 2013) (reporting on every concerned State and disputed territory in the world
through the use of a global database to support the application and implementation of
international law in armed conflict).
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variables of presumed importance (i.e., regime attributes and other
proxies). Finally, it correlates conflict and IHL compliance data in
ways that offer new insights into traditional problems of conflict
and war. By utilizing this data, one can examine Muslim state
conflict trends, including by region, time period, and conflict type
(i.e., IAC or NIAC), and provide baseline data for Muslim states
that may be correlated with other data (e.g., development reports,
security expenditures, human rights).
In what follows, we introduce the data, its IHL-based
assumptions, and discuss resulting differences from extant
datasets. By using bivariate analyses, we then demonstrate spatial
and temporal patterns in the conflict behavior for Muslim states,
and, finally, conclude with a discussion of future research on the
subject.
II. Muslim States, Ethnicity, and Religion in Quantitative
Conflict Studies
In the empirical conflict literature in political science, war is
generally understood as a political or economic development
issue-not an international legal matter. 2 While political and
legal premises are by no means mutually exclusive, little
quantitative conflict research examines the highly conventional
nature of war in the legal sense, the vast body of modern
international treaty and customary law regulating war as it informs
state-based conflict behavior, or the role of international law in
defining what counts as war in the interstate system in the first
place." Accordingly, scholars generally interpret conflicts in
Muslim states, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, as best
explained by political regimes, grievances, economic and natural
resource variables, and their analytical proxies (i.e.,
authoritarianism, per capita income, population size, economic
12 Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls' College,
Oxford, A European Lecture delivered at The Graduate Inst. of Int'l Relations, Geneva,
The Changing Character of War: A European Lecture Delivered at the Graduate Institute
of International Relations 2, 2-5 (Nov. 9, 2006) (discussing the meanings of war).
13 See generally HEw STRACHAN & SIBYLLE SCHEIPERS, THE CHANGING
CHARACTER OF WAR 17-20 (Hew Strachan & Sibylle Scheipers eds., 2011) (arguing that
post-Cold War and 9/11 "new wars" scholarship is often "historically unaware,"
beholden to theories that "privilege some wars and certain trends over others," in ways
that ignore "the messiness of reality" and fail to examine "the other dimensions" that
"help us to define what war is legal, ethical, religious, and social").
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development)-not by conflict behavior and international norm
compliance in and after conflict.14  This and the next section
address the significance of a legal definition of armed conflict
today-contra Clausewitz-in highlighting some potential
comparative advantages of this data.
Research in political science and economics has long favored
regime type and economic development as the most common
correlates of interstate war," while similar rubrics apply to
intrastate conflicts.16 It is now axiomatic in interstate conflict, for
instance, that "[d]emocracies rarely go to war with one another,"
though underlying causal mechanisms (less so theories) have been
revised over time." Likewise, for intrastate conflict, statistically
significant variables are dominated by political and especially
economic factors.' Until recently, for instance, debate on civil
war centered on whether economic resources ("greed") or political
regime variables ("grievance") correlate with war." Paul Collier
and Anke Hoeffler's classic essays on "greed over grievance,"20
14 See VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 1, at 11-13 (discussing the tension between
political and legal facets of war).
15 See generally Anke Hoeffler, On the Causes of Civil War, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT 179 (Michelle Garfinkel &
Stergios Skaperdas eds., 2012) (discussing how the different approaches for determining
causes of war are much more like correlates than actual causes).
16 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peach and Conflict Research,
Onset of Intrastate Armed Conflict, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/
onset of intrastate armed conflict/ [hereinafter Uppsala Data Set] (making available
UCDP datasets for intrastate armed conflicts).
17 See Erik Gartzke, The Capitalist Peace, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 166, 176 (2007);
Sebastian Rosato, The Flawed Logic ofDemocratic Peace Theory, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
585 (2003) (explaining that contemporary theory is wrong, when interests clash
democracies will have conflict and fight, and it is wrong to say otherwise); Brian Lai &
Dan Slater, Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in
Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 113 (2006) (focusing on
regimes). But see Mark Peceny, Caroline C. Beer & Shannon Sanchez-Terry,
'Dictatorial Peace?', 96 AM. POL. Sa. REv. 15 (2002) (discussing some statistical
evidence on the 'autocratic peace').
18 Uppsala Data Set, supra note 16.
19 See generally Havard Strand, Onset of Armed Conflict: A New List for the
Period 1946-2004, with Applications (unpublished Ph.D. thesis) (on file with the
Department of Political Science, University of Oslo & the Centre for the Study of the
Civil War, PRIO) (discussing new onsets of armed conflict and taking into account
ambiguous nature of defining causes of war such as an emphasis on the effect of political
regimes).
20 See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 46 J.
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and Collier's subsequent work with Nicholas Sambanis, find
economic variables-poverty, abundant natural resources, and low
national income-key to explaining civil strife, above and beyond
political grievances or matters of social identity, including ethnic
cleavages.2 1 James Fearon and David Laitin also find economic
factors, such as rebels' resource advantages and political variables,
such as bureaucratically weak states and political instability,
important in civil war outbreak.2 2 Other works in this vein have
explored the role of natural resources and economic shocks;23
while more recent works have returned to regime-type factors
from resource-based variables to predict political instability.24
In the last decade, however, a growing body of research-
CONFLICT RESOL. 13 (2002) (finding that Africa's proneness to conflict is due to its
economic structure); Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars,
54 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 563 (2004) (contrasting the idea that motive for rebellion
should be the emphasis of study with the idea that economic accounts need a stronger
emphasis with regard to conflict); Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler & Dominic Rohner,
Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War, 61 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS I
(2009) (introducing the feasibility hypothesis, which states that where civil war is
feasible, it will result regardless of motivation).
21 See generally Syed Mansoob Murshed & Mohammad Zulfan Tadjoeddin,
Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict, 21 J.
INT'L DEV. 87 (2009) (discussing that the presence of greed or grievance is not sufficient
for conflict outbreaks); Jack Hirshleifer, Theorizing about Conflict (UCLA Dept. of
Economics, Working Paper No. 727, 1995) (providing an important refinement on the
motive/opportunity dichotomy by classifying the possible causes of conflict into
preferences, opportunities, and perceptions whereby the introduction of perceptions
allows for the possibility that both opportunities and grievances might be wrongly
perceived); JACK HIRSHLEIFER, THE DARK SIDE OF THE FORCE: ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
OF CONFLICT THEORY 14-15, 27-39 (2001) (discussing preferences and perceptions).
22 James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, 97
AM. POL. SCI. REv. 75, 75-99 (2003).
23 See generally Macartan Humphreys, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict
Resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 508 (2005) (discussing
the resource-conflict theory that rebel greed and resource dependence are factors that
cause violence); Gerard Padr6 i Miquel & Sylvain Chassang, Economic Shocks and Civil
War, 4 Q. J. POL. SCI. 211 (2009) (theorizing that it is negative income shocks that cause
civil wars).
24 Jack A. Goldstone et al., A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability, 54
AM. J. POL. SCI. 190, 194 (2010) (using regime type as a focus for conflict); Charles
Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution 13 (Ctr. for Res. on Soc. Org., U. Mich.,
Working Paper No. 156, 1978) (emphasizing the impact that changes in social
mobilization and political association have on political instability, which ultimately
results in unrest and possible revolt).
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some skeptical of econometric methods and assumptions2 5-has
posited that ethnicity and also religion are core, if neglected,
elements in the conflict puzzle in ways not yet adequately
understood or measured.2 6 After all, when Fearon and Laitin
explained the prevalence of post-Cold War civil violence in
economic and political conditions favoring insurgency, they were
arguing against then conventional wisdom that linked modem civil
wars to ethnic and religious antagonisms.2 7 The early standard
bearer in this discussion was Samuel Huntington's cultural or
civilizationalist frame on inter/intra-national conflict.2 8 Notably,
Huntington posited cultural and demographic features in Islamic
societies that made them conflict prone and described Islam as
having "bloody borders" or "bloody innards"-euphemisms for
Islam's respective role in interstate or intrastate wars.2 9 Such
25 See Stathis N. Kalyvas, Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging Research
Program: The Microdynamics of Civil War, in ORDER, CONFLICT, AND VIOLENCE 397-
399 (Ian Shapiro & Tarek Masoud eds., 2008); Stathis N. Kalyvas, 'New' and 'Old' Civil
Wars: A Valid Distinction?, 54 WORLD POL. 99, 109-13 (2001); Christopher Cramer,
Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological Individualism, Rational Choice, and
the Political Economy of War, 30 WORLD DEv. 1845 (2002) (criticizing the emphasis of
economic theories for causes of conflict); Nicholas Sambanis, What is Civil War?
Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition, 48 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 814, 848-55 (2004); Nicholas Sambanis & Hfvard Hegre, Sensitivity Analysis of
Empirical Results on Civil War Onset, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 508, 522 (2006); Macartan
Humphreys, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the
Mechanisms, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 508, 510-13 (2005).
26 See generally Nicholas Sambanis, Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the
Same Causes?, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 259 (2001) (discussing how political grievances
play a bigger part in civil unrest than a lack of economic opportunity); see also Lars-Erik
Cederman & Luc Girardin, Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto
Nationalist Insurgencies, 101 AM. POL. SC. REV. 173, 182-83 (2007); James Fearon,
Kimuli Kasara & David Laitin, Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset, 101 AM. POL.
SCI. REv. 187, 190-92 (2007); Nicholas Sambanis & HAvard Hegre, Sensitivity Analysis
ofEmpirical Results on Civil War Onset, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 508, 515 (2006); Stathis
N. Kalyvas & Matt A. Kocher, Ethnic Cleavages and Irregular War: Iraq and Vietnam,
35 PoL. & SOC. 183, 184-86 (2007); Andreas Wimmer & Brian Min, From Empire to
Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Modern World, 1816-2001, 71 AM. Soc. REV. 867
(2006).
27 Fearon & Laitin, supra note 22, at 79-82.
28 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 256-58 (1996).
29 Id.; see also Tusicisny, supra note 4, at 490-97 (validating some of Huntington's
theses using the Uppsala's ACD); Indra de Soysa & Ragnhild Nordas, Islam's Bloody
Innards? Religion and Political Terror, 1980-2000, 51 INT'L STUD. Q. 927, 938-40
(2007) (finding that states demographically dominated by Muslims are less likely than
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analysis was by no means exceptional at the time. Gellner, for
instance, argued that the larger the number of ethnic groups in a
country, the more likely nationalist conflicts would occur." Even
after the demise of the Soviet Union, scholars shifted methods, but
generally still explained internal conflicts in terms of ethnic and
religious nationalisms."
To be sure, ethnic mobilization-as well as social identity
factors, cultural nationalism, and religious behavior-have been
longstanding subjects of concern in conflict.32 It was only with the
advent of large cross-national datasets, notably, Singer and Small's
Correlates of War project in the 1970s," as well as Uppsala
University's Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) later,34 that ethnicity
and religion were found to be "much less important than [was]
commonly believed" in "systematically" increasing civil war." In
fact, large-N studies were pivotal in finding diverse societies
"usually safer than more homogenous societies," as disputes along
ethnic-religious lines were only more likely "to turn violent in
countries with low and declining incomes."" Further, such diverse
others to experience state-sponsored repression-though Arab states reverse this result,
consistent with other findings). But see Jonathan Fox, Paradigm Lost: Huntington 's
Unfulfilled Clash of Civilizations Prediction into the 21st Century, 42 INT'L POL. 428
(2005) (critiquing Huntington's theories).
3o ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 21, 128-29, 133-35 (1983).
31 See, e.g., WALKER CONNOR, ETHNONATIONALISM 51-54 (1994); BENEDICT
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 3-8 (1983); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND
BELONGING 146 (1993); DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, PANDAEMONIUM: ETHNICITY IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1993).
32 See generally Kristine Eck, From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilization
and Conflict Intensification, 53 INT'L STUD. Q. 369 (2009) (discussing the important role
of ethnicity in determining the onset and duration of armed conflict).
33 Meredith R. Sarkees, The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing
Wars (Version 4 of the Data) [hereinafter Sarkees, COW Typology]; David J. Singer &
Melvin Small, Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992,
United States Institute of Peace [USIP] No. 9905 (1993).
34 J. DAVID SINGER & MELVIN SMALL, THE WAGES OF WAR, 1816-1965: A
STATISTICAL HANDBOOK (1972); Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace
and Conflict Research, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset [hereinafter UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset], http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdpprio
armedconflictdataset/; Nils Gleditsch et. al., Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New
Dataset, 39 J. PEACE RES. 615 (2002) [hereinafter Gleditsch, Armed Conflict 1946-2001].
35 PAUL COLLIER ET AL., BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL WAR AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 4, 53 (2003).
36 Id.; See also UNDERSTANDING CIVIL WAR: EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS 18 (Paul
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states showed no greater civil war risk when compared with non-
diverse states at similar economic development levels." Yet, the
fact remained that civil wars, which have dominated global
conflict since 1945, often display highly ethnically and/or
religiously charged elements," and these conflict subtypes tend to
comprise a larger share (50 to 75 percent) of internal conflicts in
the modern period."
Thus, more recent studies have begun both to complicate the
"commonly supposed" view, as Fearon, Kasara and Laitin note,
that civil war is more likely in ethnically diverse societies; that
"plural societies" are more prone to intense internal conflict; and,
at the same time, probe more fully the lack of statistical evidence
for ethnic and religious elements in motivating various conflicts.40
Collier & Nicholas Sambanis eds., 2005); Paul Collier, Economic Causes of Civil
Conflict and Their Implications for Policy, in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR: CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD 197, 197-98 (Chester A. Crock et. al., eds., 2007).
37 See Fearon & Laitin, supra note 22, at 78; Paul Collier, Economic Causes of
Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy, in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR:
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD 197, 198-210 (Chester A. Crock, Fen
Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall eds., 2007) (pointing out the "profound gap" between
"popular perceptions of the causes of conflict" and the results of economic analysis);
Paul Collier, Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity, 44 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 839 (2000)
(showing how disciplinary lenses also frame this research, as economists tend to view
"rebellion" in terms of practical feasibility, "like a form of organized crime" situated in
"circumstances in which it is feasible").
38 Mitch Williamson, Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), WEAPONS & WARFARE
(July 5, 2014), http://weaponsandwarfare.com/?p=34835 (discussing Nigeria's
postcolonial civil war and Igbo session in 1966-70); Rwanda: A Brief History of the
Country, OUTREACH PROGRAMME ON RWANDA GENOCIDE & UN, http://www.un.org/en/
preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2014)
(discussing the notorious ethnic genocide of the Rwandan civil war of 1990-1993); Sune
Haugbolle, The Historiography and the Memory of the Lebanese Civil War, ONLINE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MASS VIOLENCE 1 (Oct. 2011), http://www.massviolence.org/The-
historiography-and-the-memory-of-the-Lebanese-civil-war (discussing the religious-
sectorial strife in Lebanon's long 1975-1990 civil war).
39 Fearon & Laitin, supra note 22, at 78-84; MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS
SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 40-
41 (2006); Political Instability Task Force, CTR. FOR GLOBAL POL'Y (June 20, 2012),
http://globalpolicy.gmu.edulpolitical-instability-task-force-home/ (describing the
Political Instability Task Force as a panel of scholars and methodologists originally
formed in 1994 at the request of senior policymakers in the U.S. government); Andreas
Wimmer & Brian Min, From Empire to Nation-State: Explaining Wars in the Modern
World, 1816-2001, 71 AM. Soc. REv. 867, 890 (2006).
40 James Fearon, Kimuli Kasara & David Laitin, Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil
War Onset, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 187, 187 (2007) (emphasizing that, it is "commonly
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Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch also find that when
horizontal (rather than individual) inequalities among ethnic
groups are considered, ethnic groups in highly unequal societies
turn out to be more conflict prone than their counterparts in
relatively equal societies.4 1 Likewise, drawing on new data and a
combined ethnic and religious diversity measures for social
fractionalization, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner clarified the
ambiguous effect of ethnicity in their original study to outline a
simpler relationship; namely, social fractionalization significantly
increases risk, with the greatest implications for the most
ethnically-diverse societies (i.e., Africa).4 2
This inquiry trend is similar-if less robust-for religion in the
quantitative conflict literature.43 Serious theory building and
cross-sectional quantitative studies emerged only later in the
1990s-in part due to the strength of dominant modernization and
secularization theories that treated religion as a declining force in
politics and world affairs." But the rise of the religious right in
U.S. domestic politics, the Iranian revolution and hostage crisis
(brought home to the West), violent Islamic opposition movements
in Iran, Algeria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and the religious
underlay of many postwar ethnic conflicts (e.g., Israel, Lebanon),
not to mention 9/11 itself, lent force and urgency to renewed
inquiry in religion and politics. What some termed the religious
"resurgence" thesis emerged, which approached religion as an
adaptive response to modernity and as a way for nonwestern states
to challenge modern secular ideologies that had failed to deliver on
supposed" that ethnically diverse countries increase the risk of civil war in the media, by
politicians, and by many political scientists and sociologists who have argued that "plural
societies" are more prone to intense internal conflict); DONALD L. HOROWITZ,
STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY IN ETHNIC CONFLICT 5-13 (1998).
41 Lars-Erik Cederman, Nils B. Weidmann & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Horizontal
Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison, 105 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 478, 483-87 (2011).
42 See generally Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler & Dominic Rohner, Beyond Greed
and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War, 61 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 38 (2009)
(discussing data sources used for social fractionalization, measured by the ethno-
linguistic fractionalization index and the religious fractionalization sources).
43 Zeev Maoz & Errol A. Henderson, The World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010:
Logic, Estimates, and Trends, 39 INT'L INTERACTIONS 265 (2013).
44 JONATHAN Fox, RELIGION, CIVILIZATION, AND CIVIL WAR: 1945 THROUGH THE
MILLENNIUM 13 (2004).
689
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
their promised economic prosperity and social progress.4 5 For
instance, Fox's analysis, based on the Minorities at Risk (MAR)
and State Failure (SF) datasets, shows an increase in religious
violence and its influence on conflict dynamics after 1965,
contradicting modernization and secularization theory, and the
expanding role (after 1980) of religious nationalist ethnic groups
in violent conflicts.4 6
Given the recent trend in the literature, it is worth bringing
ethnicity and religion back into conflict studies--one of the
endeavors of this essay. But while progress has been made in
wresting ethnicity-and to a lesser extent religion-from
methodological and conceptual limits in conflict research in ways
that remain promising for conflict research on Muslim states,
elemental questions still remain about what constitutes ethnicity,
religion, and nationalism, how one correlates and delineates
variables for these complex relationships, how such variables
relate to broader geopolitical conflict dynamics, and how those
dynamics impact Muslim state involvement in conflict. 47 As these
questions are explored in both meta-national datasets and in
country-specific micro foundation settings, problems of
complementary definitions and methodologies among formal
approaches have also emerged.4 8
45 MONICA DUFFY ToFT, DANIEL PHILPOTT & TIMOTHY S. SHAH, GOD'S CENTURY:
RESURGENT RELIGION AND GLOBAL POLITICS (2011) (examining the role of religion in
civil wars from 1940 to 2000).
46 See Erik A. Gartzke & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Identity and Conflict: Ties that
Bind and Diferences that Divide, 12 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 53, 55-56 (2006) (examining the
impact of religion on armed conflicts); see also Daniel Philpott, Explaining the Political
Ambivalence of Religion, 3 AM. POL. SCI. Ass'N. 505, 505 (2007); see also Monica Duffy
Toft, Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War, 31 INT'L SEC. 97, 97
(2007); see also Tusicisny, supra note 4, at 485.
47 See James D. Fearon, Ethnic Mobilization and Ethnic Violence, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 2-11 (Donald A. Wittman & Barry R. Weingast
eds., 2006) (discussing the debate over defining ethnicity); see also Jeffrey Stevenson
Murer, Ethnic Conflict: An Overview of Analyzing and Framing Communal Conflicts
from Comparative Perspectives, 24 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 561, 562-65 (2012).
48 See generally Stathis N. Kalyvas, Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging
Research Program: The Microdynamics of Civil War, in ORDER, CONFLICT, VIOLENCE
(Ian Shapiro & Tarek Masoud eds., 2008) (discussing the two converging insights that
have exerted pressure on the direction of recent conflict research: (1) a growing
skepticism about the limits of especially cross-country metastudies which has fostered a
helpful return to detailed country-specific cases and micro foundation research; and (2)
the view, described here, that religious and ethnic "motivations" are core elements of
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As Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer explain, the "proliferation of
data-gathering projects on armed conflict" in which every project
develops "its own foci and definitions of what constitutes armed
conflict" and uses "different criteria" has produced contradictory
results.4 9 Sarkees likewise notes "confusion in the discipline" in
which "some types of conflict (and some temporal zones) are
heavily studied" (i.e., conflict in the post-World War II era),
leaving others "ignored or under-studied"; since "most of these
projects examine conflict in such different ways," it makes
attempts "to compare their findings" a "frustrating exercise."so
After comparing datasets, Eberwein and Chojnacki concluded that
"the real world is one, but the data on violent conflicts suggest
different worlds of violence."" Similarly, Sarkees & Singer find
"the same impression of multiple parallax views" after comparing
fifteen different coding manuals.52 The problem of commensurate
definitions and datasets" is as much a problem of interdisciplinary
dialogue across data research, with implications for Muslim state
conflict research.5 4
conflict dynamics, though they present difficult methodological challenges); see also
Stathis N. Kalyvas & Laia Balcells, International System and Technologies of Rebellion:
How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict, 104 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 415
(2010) (bringing the international system back into the study of internal conflict by
disaggregating civil wars into various types).
49 Meredith Reid Sarkees et al., Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars: A
Comprehensive Look at Their Distribution over Time, 1816-1997, 47 INT'L STUD. Q. 49,
53 (2003) [hereinafter Sarkees et al., War Distribution Over Time].
5o Id. at 53-54.
51 Wolf-Dieter Eberwein & Sven Chojnacki, Scientific Necessity and Political
Utility: A Comparison of Data on Violent Conflicts 1, 8 (preparing for the Uppsala
Conference in Uppsala, Sweden on June 8-9, 2001).
52 Sarkees et al., War Distribution Over Time, supra note 49, at 54.
53 See id. at 53 (explaining the "proliferation of data-gathering projects on armed
conflict" in which every project develops "its own foci and definitions of what
constitutes armed conflict" and uses "different criteria" has produced contradictory
results"). There is generally confusion in the discipline with regard to the types of
conflicts and the temporal zones studied. For example, some zones are more heavily
studied than others (i.e., conflict in the post-World War II era), thereby leaving others
"ignored or under-studied." Id. Due to the difference in the focus for different projects,
there is difficulty in comparing project findings. Id. In fact, it has often been referred to
as a "frustrating exercise." Id. See also Eberwein & Chojnacki, supra note 51, at 8
(concluding after comparing datasets that "the real world is one, but the data on violent
conflicts suggest different worlds of violence").
54 See Sarkees et al., War Distribution Over Time, supra note 49, at 50-51
(discussing that although social scientists have worked to strengthen the empirical
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In this context, the universal definition of armed conflict
available in international humanitarian law may help clarify
differences in respective approaches to conflict across data in
productive ways." Yet, as mentioned, one reason why IHL has
remained opaque to empirical conflict inquiry has to do, again,
with divergent disciplinary pathways and missed opportunities for
interdisciplinary dialogue-in this case, the different paths taken
by post-World War II IR theory and international law scholarship,
including conceptions of war in political science and international
law and their subfields (i.e. civil war, terrorism)." Social science
approaches have been increasingly applied to the law-but not
vice versa-causing a disciplinary divide that has intensified with
'new wars' debates over inherited paradigms." Against this
markers of war in and even across datasets, the trends identified by Sarkees, Wayman &
Singer have become more pronounced in the intervening decade, as microfoundational
studies have disaggregated inquiry further); see also J. David Singer, Variables,
Indicators, and Data: The Measurement Problem in Macropolitical Research, in
MEASURING THE CORRELATES OF WAR 181, 181 (J. David Singer & Paul Diehl Michigan
eds., 1994). But see Stathis N. Kalyvas, Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging Research
Program: The Microdynamics of Civil War, in ORDER, CONFLICT, VIOLENCE 397 (Ian
Shapiro & Tarek Masoud eds., 2008) (identifying the problems with econometric
studies).
55 See Sarkees et al., War Distribution Over Time, supra note 49, at 58 (noting that
"the motivation was to expand the war typology to address certain types of armed
conflict not previously included").
56 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205, 205 (1993); see Eric Posner & Jack L.
Goldsmith, The New International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L. 463, 480
(2006); see Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law and International Relations
Theory: Twenty Years Later, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 613-14 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff
& Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012); see generally Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal
Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 517 (2000) (discussing the
method designed for "neutralizing distortions attributable to changes in database size
over time").
57 See Chandra Lekha Sriram, International Law, International Relations Theory
and Post-Atrocity Justice: Towards a Genuine Dialogue, 82 INT'L AFFAIRS 467, 467
(2006); see MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 192 (1991)
(discussing future wars); see MARY KALDOR, NEW AND OLD WARS: ORGANIZED
VIOLENCE IN A GLOBAL ERA 69 (1999) (supporting the authors position that "new wars"
broadly-refers not only to Kaldor-but to research in global security studies, strategic
and military theory, and national security, counterterrorism, and international law in
parallel discussions in the social sciences and legal scholarship); see JOHN KISZELY,
POST-MODERN CHALLENGES FOR MODERN WARRIORS 6 (2007); see Michael N. Schmitt,
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broadly understood backdrop of scholarly and empirical
complexity in international security studies, voluminous empirical
conflict literature with unsettled opinions about the definition of
war makes perfect sense. But it is also for this reason that it is
worth considering the utility of longstanding normative
architecture governing armed conflict to define such conflicts-
those rules are designed not only to humanize war,ss but to also
regulate and restrain conflict behavior by all parties engaged in
hostilities.59
III.International Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflict
Regulation
For our purposes, one of the most intriguing problems in
quantitative conflict research is the effects-based, ad hoc method
for defining war across formal analyses that neglect key theoretical
assumptions and implications about war, conflict, and political
violence. 6 0  As our dataset turns on the very different legal
definition of armed conflict based in the IHL framework, we
address first, here and in the following section, the distinctive
elements in the law of war standard, its different assumptions
about the nature and meaning of conflict, and its inseparability
from the interplay of global security politics in the international
system. This discussion also seeks to raise the somewhat
surprising fact that the legal concept of armed conflict under
IHL-the regime ratified by every nation in the world, including
all Muslim states-is strikingly unfamiliar to much empirical
Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 62 A.F. L. REv. 1, 2
(2007).
58 See 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR
53 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelf eds., 3d. ed. 2000) [hereinafter 1868 St. Petersburg
Declaration] (stating the importance of fixing the "technical limits at which the
necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity").
59 See Erik A. Gartzke & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Identity and Conflict: Ties that
Bind and Differences that Divide, 12 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 53, 62 (2006); see Tusicisny,
supra note 4, at 486.
60 See infra "MSACC Approach to IHL-Defined Armed Conflicts" (providing
detailed definitions). We coded all armed conflicts as either internal (i.e. civil wars) or
interstate wars, dating the war start for the first year when the violence level was coded
as war, and the end when state or non-state armed forces withdrew their combat
operations.
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conflict research discussion.'
Developed largely in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
the modem laws of war embody the jus contra bellum period, the
prohibition of the use of inter-state force and the criminalization of
aggressive war, reflected in the U.N. Charter of 1945 (among other
instruments), itself an artifact of legal positivist, realist, and
humanist responses to the trauma of modem "world" wars. 62 The
need for the jus in bello belongs to the earlier post-Westphalian
period in which norms were needed to alleviate the calamities of
war because going to war was regarded by States as the general
rule, a freedom to wage war as both instrument of foreign policy
and guarantor of sovereignty." In this respect, the laws of war
were designed to balance military necessity with humanism.6 In
fact, the effectiveness of this legal regime is predicated on the
"subtle equilibrium between two diametrically opposed impulses,"
rules crafted to minimize human suffering without undermining
military operations.6 ' This balance calculus was captured in the St.
Petersburg declaration: "to fix the technical limits at which the
necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of
humanity."' The contemporary guardian of this branch of public
international law, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), 6 defines the modem legal framework of IHL as a set of
61 See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD, INT'L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS [ICRC] 32 (1952) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS] ("The substitution of [armed conflict] for the word 'war' was deliberate.
One may argue almost endlessly about the legal definition of 'war' ... . The expression
'armed conflict' makes such arguments less easy. Any difference arising between two
States and leading to the intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict . .. [i]t makes
no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. The drafters
of the Geneva Conventions deliberately rejected the term "war"-in favor of "armed
conflict"-given the history of states refusing to declare war as part of a rationale for not
applying the law to a given conflict.").
62 See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 5-6 (2010).
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 Id. at 16.
66 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 58, at 53.
67 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 1352 (Yves Sandoz
et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS].
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rules that seek for humanitarian reasons to limit the negative
effects of armed conflict on vulnerable populations by protecting
both persons not or no longer participating in hostilities (civilians,
wounded, prisoners of war) and by restricting the means and
methods of warfare." Cardinal principles that underpin and guide
this law's evolution are the principles of distinction,
proportionality, and military necessity (all part of customary law),
as well as the principle of humanity or the prohibition on
unnecessary suffering.
In order to be broadly applicable, the laws of armed conflict
deliberately define situations of armed conflict in the most
expansive terms as "any difference arising between two States ...
68 See generally St6phane Jeannet, Recognition of the ICRC's Long-standing Rule
of Confidentiality: An Important Decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, INT'L REV. RED CROSS 403 (2000), available at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqhq.htm (noting the ICRC is
specifically referred to in forty articles of the Geneva Conventions and in eight articles of
the Additional Protocols). The author makes the point that the "law of armed conflict,"
the "laws of war," and the "laws and customs of war" are synonymous terms designating
a cluster of norms based on the Geneva and Hague Conventions and a longer tradition of
customary international law stretching into values and principles from the medieval
period. Id. The more recent term "international humanitarian law," though also used
interchangeably with the other terms of art, encompasses a broader category of laws and
principles beyond the traditional laws of armed conflict, including war crimes, but laws
related to genocide and crimes against humanity. Id.
69 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b) (supporting the author's
point that many IHL rules now constitute international custom, rules derived from
"evidence of a general [state] practice accepted as law" and based on opinio juris ('the
belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a law requiring it')).
Customary international law in Article 38(1)(b) is defined as "evidence of a general
practice accepted as law," established by two factors, the general practice of states and
what states have accepted as law (or opinion juris sive necessitates)); see Continental
Shelf, Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, $177, 44 (Feb. 20), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docketlindex.php?sum=295&code-cs2&pl=3&p2=3&case=52&k-cc&p3=5
(describing "two conditions" for international customary law: "Not only must the acts
concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be .. . carried out in such a
way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a
subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitates.
The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a
legal obligation. The frequency or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself
enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol,
which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations
of courtesy, convenience, or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty."); see JEAN-
MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW XXXIX (2009).
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leading to the intervention of armed forces"-even "if one of the
Parties denies the existence of a state of war" and no matter "how
long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place."o The
Correlates of War (COW)7 1 or the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset (ACD) 72 in which numbers of "battle-related deaths" are
the standard means by which scholars determine the existence of
armed conflict and war is done so in addition to political and
70 See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, supra note 61, at 32; see
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal, 70, 193 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)
(noting that in jurisprudence, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) echoed this general definition of international armed conflict in the
Tadic case: "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between
States").
71 See J. David Singer & Melvin Small, The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A
Statistical Handbook (1972) (containing the correlates of War Project database); MELVIN
SMALL & J. DAVID SINGER, RESORT TO ARMS: INTERNATIONAL AND CIVIL WAR, 1816-
1980 (1982) [hereinafter RESORT TO ARMS]; see Meredith Reid Sarkees, Codebook for
the Intra-State Wars v. 4.0. Definitions and Variables 1, 1 (2010) [hereinafter Sarkees,
Codebook], available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%2OData/War
DataNEW/Intra-StateWarsCodebook.pdf; see Nils Gleditsch et al., Armed Conflict
1946-2001: A New Dataset, 39 J. PEACE RES. 615, 617-619 (2002) (providing
information for the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD)); see generally Sarkees,
COW Typology, supra note 33 (discussing the COW project database).
72 See generally RESORT TO ARMS, supra note 71 (developing a typology for wars
based on war participants, namely as states with means of exerting their independence
and playing a role in international relations: (1) interstate wars are conflicts conducted by
members of the interstate system; (2) extra-systemic wars are conflicts conducted
between a system member and a non-state, non-system entity; (3) intra-state or civil wars
are conflicts conducted between a state and a subnational group within its borders; and
(4) under the expanded typology, nonstate wars); see also Sarkees, COW Typology,
supra note 33, at 5 (stating that within the COW war typology, an intra-state war must
meet the same definitional requirements of all wars (i.e. sustained combat, involving
organized armed forces, resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related combatant
fatalities within a twelve month period); see Sarkees, Codebook, supra note 71, at I
(When Small & Singer first extended their study of war to include intra-state wars in
RESORT TO ARMS, supra note 71, they established the requisite condition that for a
conflict to be a war, it must involve armed forces capable of "effective resistance" on
both sides. They then developed two alternative criteria for defining effective resistance:
"(a) both sides had to be initially organized for violent conflict and prepared to resist the
attacks of their antagonists, or (b) the weaker side, although initially unprepared, is able
to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it
sustains." Effective resistance criteria were specifically utilized to differentiate wars
from massacres, one-sided state killings, or general riots by unorganized individuals.
Such one-sided violence is not considered the same phenomenon as war and is not
included here. However, this distinction is sometimes difficult to make particularly in
intra-state conflict); RESORT TO Arms, supra note 71, at 215.
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territorial determinations under IHL." The law is then "triggered"
by the existence of an armed conflict when hostilities rise to the
level of "armed force between States" (and other organized actors)
in a threshold defined by law.74 Under IHL "armed conflict," the
legal term for war is distinguished from other forms of political
violence that remain at the level of "internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature.""
In instances of political violence that fall below the threshold
of armed conflict, no special rules (lex specialis) come into force
that revise fundamental legal authorities for targeting, killing,
detention without a trial, etc. Critically, IHL applies only in the
event of an armed conflict and therefore only regulates conduct
during hostilities." It is distinct from the legal regime enshrined in
73 See Sarkees et al., War Distribution Over Time, supra note 49, at 58 (discussing
battle deaths).
74 See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law:
Challenges from the 'War on Terror', 27 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF. 55, 58 (2003)
(noting that "[hiumanitarian law applies, as a general matter, when the Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocols say it applies, namely, in the event of armed
conflict"); see Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31[hereinafter
Geneva Convention 1], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/yl
gcacws.htm.
75 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 2, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II], available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Professionallnterest/protocol2.pdf.
76 See id. at art. 1(2) (excluding "situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as
not being armed conflicts" from non-international armed conflict). This exclusion is
seen as reflective of customary international law in all non-international armed conflicts,
as evident in its adoption in the Statute of the International Criminal Court. See e.g., Int'l
Criminal Court [ICC], Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8.2(d), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publ
ications/RomeStatutEng.pdf [hereinafter Rome Statute] (noting that Article 8 specifically
excludes "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature," from the ambit of non-
international armed conflict). Note that this exclusion has been broadly accepted as
reflective of customary international law in all non-international armed conflicts and that
when the armed conflict ends, lex generalis-peacetime rules and fundamental human
rights-return.
77 See ADVISORY SERVICE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: WHAT IS
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW?, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC] (July
2004), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what-is-ihl.pdf
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Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter governing the resort to force (jus
ad bellum). 8 Thus, insofar as the existence of an armed conflict is
the predicate for triggering this law, the concept of armed conflict
receives a great deal of analytical weight under this legal regime
because it both sets the regime in motion and dictates the
parameters for conflict actors' behavior under its strictures."
While the term "armed conflict" remains undefined in treaty
law, legal scholars have long pointed out that determining the
existence of an international armed conflict (IAC) war between
states, is purposely clear and uncontroversial under IHL, for two
deliberate reasons-one political, the other empirical.so As the
ICRC's Commentary on Common Article 2 reveals, the term
"armed conflict" was substituted for "war" by Convention drafters
to prevent states from downplaying their hostile acts to exempt
them from obeying the rules." Moreover, the reason for
depoliticizing war, for limiting a belligerent state's ability to
interpret the meaning of their hostile acts as a condition of their
behavior in war, was obvious: "The drafters deliberately went
beyond the legalistic term 'war' in favor of the broader principle
of armed conflict" that "was intended to be broadly defined in
order to extend the reach of the Conventions to as many conflicts
as possible."82 As the Commentary makes clear, "[a]ny difference
78 See Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming the
Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 963, 967 (2008),
available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-moussa.pdf.
79 See id. at 967.
80 See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS, supra note 61, at 21 (noting
that Article 2 armed conflicts encompass any difference between states that lead to
military intervention, even if parties deny the existence of a state of war, and, again, the
duration of the conflict and the number of deaths are irrelevant).
81 Id. at 55; see Tokyo Judgment, 490, 48/414, 49/594 (Int'l Mil. Trib. Far East
Nov. 4, 1948) (supporting the author's position that States would mislabel their hostile
acts to avoid the humanitarian obligations that formal legal requirements of war would
bring, i.e., treating captured forces as prisoners of war). Successive Japanese
governments, for instance, identified campaigns in China and Manchuria as police
"incidents" which did not trigger the laws of war. Id. "From the outbreak of the
Mukden Incident till the end of the war. [ ... ] Japanese Governments refused to
acknowledge that the hostilities in China constituted a war" and with this "excuse," the
"military authorities persistently asserted that the rules of war did not apply in the
conduct of the hostilities." Id.
82 RICHARD P. DIMEGLIO ET AL., JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH.,
U.S. ARMY, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 24 (William J. Johnson &
Andrew D. Gillman eds., 2012), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd
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arising between two States and leading to the intervention of
armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2,
even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war.""
Under IHL, then, armed conflict is broadly defined to capture
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States, evident
in their mobilized armed forces."
Second, for these same reasons-given the special license to
use lethal force granted to states' armed forces under the
distinctive circumstances of warss-the threshold of armed conflict
is not only intentionally set low, but determined by an empirical or
de facto standard in the existence of armed hostilities." That is,
modem IHL comes into force-not, as mentioned, on the basis of
a requisite formal declaration of war, by virtue of how belligerents
perceive or characterize hostilities, or even by numbers of persons
killed-but on the basis of the facts of a situation, the de facto
existence of armed hostilities, indicated by active involvement of
states' armed forces in hostile behavior." This is to say that
/MilitaryLaw/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2012.pdf, see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New
Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law ofArmed Conflict by Non-State Actors,
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711, 807-08 (2008) (arguing that states' ability to
manipulate conflict classification encourages noncompliance by non-state actors).
83 See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], How is the Term "Armed Conflict"
Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, Opinion Paper 1-2 (Mar. 17, 2008)
[hereinafter ICRC, Term "Armed Conflict" in IHL], https://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
84 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Back to the Future: De Facto Hostilities, Transnational
Terrorism, and the Purpose of the Law ofArmed Conflict, 30 U. PENN. J. INT'L L. 1345,
1353 (2009) (noting "armed conflict is defined by the authority to use deadly force as a
measure of first resort").
85 See Rona, supra note 74, at 57-58 (noting that such rules activated in the legally
delimited space of war enable "elevat[ing] the essence of war-killing and detaining
people without trial-into a right" for "persons designated as 'privileged combatants'
such as soldiers in an army." Rona further describes IHL as a compromise: the "aims of
humanitarian law are humanitarian, namely, to minimize unnecessary suffering by
regulating the conduct of hostilities and the treatment of persons in the power of the
enemy." The author further comments that in return for such protections, IHL
legitimates "the essence of war," the combatant privilege to use deadly force against
adversaries. In no other domestic or international legal context may government agents
resort to deadly force as a measure of first resort-except in an armed conflict when
individuals are determined to be enemy belligerents (or civilians taking a direct part in
hostilities) and, hence, lawful targets).
86 See id at 59 (noting that "the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto
authority over persons within determinate territory").
87 See DIMEGLIO ET AL., supra note 82, at 24 ("[T]his is a true defacto standard" in
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determining when states are engaged in hostilities (even if they
insist they are not in a state of war) is an objective, empirical
determination." Not only does this de facto armed conflict
standard "maximize the applicability of humanitarian protections
for [war] victims,"89 it has the benefit of limiting the political
maneuvering that often suffuses the domain of warfare insofar as
war remains in Clausewitz's famous formulation a "policy"
choice." Put another way, in disputes between sovereign states,
any hostilities that involve the intervention of states' armed forces,
no matter how brief in duration or limited in intensity, trigger the
application of this law." Common Article 2 discusses
international armed conflicts between two or more states,
including occupation situations, are by this standard easily
discernible for purposes of inclusion in our dataset.92
the sense that the "subjective intent of the belligerents is irrelevant. The drafters
deliberately went beyond the legalistic term 'war' in favor of the broader principle of
armed conflict" and, according to the Commentary on the Geneva Conventions, "this
article was intended to be broadly defined in order to extend the reach of the
Conventions to as many conflicts as possible.").
88 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 241 (June 27, 1986), available at http://www.worldcourts.com
/icj/eng/decisions/1986.06.27_militaryparamilitary.htm (noting in ICJ's Nicaragua case,
that this determination included the United States arming of insurgents-without boots
on the ground).
89 See Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria,
Law and the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 693, 708
(2013).
90 VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note I ("We know, certainly, that War is only called
forth through the political intercourse of Governments and Nations; but in general it is
supposed that such intercourse is broken off by War, and that a totally different state of
things ensures, subject to no laws but its own. We maintain, on the contrary, that War is
a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means.").
91 See Sylvain Vit6, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian
Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 873 INT'L REV. RED CROSs 69, 73 (2009)
(explaining that "the Protocol stipulates that the situations targeted by Article 2 common
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions include 'armed conflicts in which peoples are
fighting,"' thereby supporting the author's position that most experts presume that any
fighting between armed forces of states is covered by the Geneva Conventions).
92 See Blank & Corn, supra note 89, at 700-01 ("During war, armed forces employ
lethal force against enemy personnel and objects as a first resort. In contrast, the
peacetime authority to use force - regulated by international human rights principles -
restricts lethal force to a measure of last resort permitted only based on individualized
threat determinations."). This broad definition of armed conflict is a sober reflection of
the essence of warfare, namely, the fact that war enables states to use lethal force
lawfully as a measure of first resort against adversaries-not as a measure of last resort
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But just as the existence of an armed conflict triggers the
application of IHL to govern the status of persons and the behavior
(the rights and obligations) of parties to the conflict, the type of
conflict-international or non-international-sets parameters on
the extent of applicable law." While this distinction has been both
contested and eroding post-9/11, the Geneva Conventions
traditionally recognize two types of conflict: international (state-
versus-state) conflict in which the full corpus of the law comes
into force; and non-international (internal, civil wars, state versus
non-states) conflict, understood as "protracted armed hostilities
between a state and a non-state armed group or groups," subject to
the more limited Common Article 3 regime and customary
international law.94 Determining which conflicts meet the
definition of non-international, armed conflict under IHL has been
more difficult."
as in law enforcement or police operations (or in capture campaigns).
93 United Nations Human Rights, International Protection of Human Rights in
Armed Conflict 1, 1 (2011), available at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/publ
ications/hrinarmedconflict.pdf (noting that "international human rights law and
international humanitarian law are not important parameters").
94 Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], International Humanitarian Law and the
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 31" Int'l Conf. of the Red Cross & Red
Crescent 3 (2011) [hereinafter ICRC, Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts]
(stating "the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them" and "shall also apply to all
cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if
the said occupation meets with no armed resistance"). But see ICRC, Geneva
Convention Relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War 32 (1949), available at
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/lal3O44f3bbb5b8ec12563fb0066f226/466097d7a
301f8c4cl2563cd00424e2b (setting forth minimum provisions "in the case of armed
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties"); see EMILY CRAWFORD, UNEQUAL BEFORE THE LAW: THE CASE FOR
THE ELIMINATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 1 1/28 1,
15, 36 (2007); see James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in
International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 850
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 313, 316, 339 (2003); see Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying a
Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of Armed Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 685, 689
(2012).
95 See MICHAEL SCHMITr, ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT THE FAULT LINES 524-25
(TMC Asser, The Hague, Netherlands, 2012) (explaining the vast legal scholarship in the
last two decades by exploring the challenges in applying the traditional laws of war to
military operations directed against non-state actors (particularly, extraterritorially) and
terrorism, more, specifically, is vast); see Geoffrey Corn & Eric Jensen, Untying the
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In contrast to Common Article 2, Common Article 3 sets forth
minimum provisions applicable "in the case of armed conflict not
of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the
High Contracting Parties,"" such as humane treatment for
noncombatants and those who are hors de combat, among other
requirements." These reduced protections have arisen historically
from states' sovereignty concerns and their views that rebellions
and civil wars were internal affairs, for which governments had
little patience for externally-imposed rules." In international law
more generally, sovereignty is the legal barrier that normally
protects states "from outside interference in its internal affairs," so
that "whenever international law operates to regulate the conduct
of a State, it must (first) pierce the shield of sovereignty." 99 Thus,
the need for the triggering conditions identified in Common
Articles 2 and 3, and to a lesser extent, Article I, Protocol IIJ*oo
Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War
on Terror, 81 TEMPLE L. REv. 787, 791 (2008); see Robert Chesney, Beyond the
Battlefield, beyond Al Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism,
112 MICH. L. REV. 163, 180 (2013).
96 See ICRC, Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note 94, at 3
(noting the territorial language of CA 3 has given scholars pause, but insofar as the four
Geneva Conventions are universally ratified, the requirement that the conflict must occur
"in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties" has lost its relevance in practice
as "any armed conflict between governmental armed forces and armed groups or
between such groups cannot but take place on the territory of one of the Parties to the
Convention").
97 See Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War and the Notion
of Armed Conflict -A Tentative Conceptualization, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 95, I 12
(2009).
98 See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION
OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR, ICRC 44 (Oscar M. Uhler & Henri Coursier eds.,
1958) (discussing historical motives for integrating Common Article 3 into the revised
Geneva Conventions of 1949, imposing limited but revolutionary standards of conduct
for internal conflicts and enabling unprecedented intrusion into state sovereignty). Prior
to 1949, international humanitarian law contained no positive law applicable to internal
conflicts, framed within the zone of state sovereignty, such that minimal authority
existed for the applicability of international customary regulatory norms. Id.; see also
EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS 33-43 (2008) (discussing
"[t]he laws of war applicable in internal armed conflicts").
99 See DIMEGLIO ET AL, supra note 82, at 23.
100 See id. (noting that once the "requirements for piercing the shield of sovereignty
have been satisfied," IHL "intrudes upon the sovereignty of the regulated State by
limiting the means and methods of its application of violence in combat, and by
imposing obligations to respect and protect certain persons and places." Further, the
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Now, amidst ongoing debate over the predominance of non-
international wars after World War II and the intensity of these
and related conflict types in the post 9/11 era, NIACs are generally
understood as armed conflicts between state forces and non-state
armed groups (or between such non-state groups only) without the
original territorial limit outlined in Common Article 3."o' In
determining which conflicts rise to the level of a NIAC and to
differentiate Common Article 3 conflicts from less serious forms
of political or social violence (i.e., internal disturbances, riots,
violent protests, acts of banditry),'02 the jurisprudential standard
has been that the "armed conflict must achieve a certain threshold
of confrontation."o 3 Two guidelines are set out in case law: (1)
hostilities must rise to a minimum level of intensity"; and (2)
non-state adversaries must exhibit a minimum level of
organization. ' Thus, we use jurisprudential standards to
determine NIAC threshold requirements, including judgments by
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) 0 6 that established the NIAC thresholds and tests.' 7  We
"extent of this intrusion" depends directly on the type of conflict, but includes
restrictions on targeting, requirements for the treatment of detainees, and the imposition
of criminal liability for failure to abide by the law).
lo, See ICRC, Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, supra note 94, at 17
(2011).
102 Id. (noting that less serious forms of violence include internal disturbances and
tensions, such as "riots or acts of banditry").
103 Id. at 3.
104 See DIMEGLIO ET AL, supra note 82, at 26.
1os See id. at 26-27 (asking such questions as: "i. Does the group have an organized
military force?; ii. Are members of the group subject to some authority?; iii. Does the
group control some territory?; iv. Does the group demonstrate respect for the LOAC?
This is more often accepted to mean that the group must not demonstrate an
unwillingness to abide by the LOAC v. Does the government respond to the group with
regular armed forces?"). But see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and
Judgment, 1 562 at 193 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj705O7JT2-e.pdf (noting two criterias to a
NIAC, namely, the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties to the
conflict).
06 See DIMEGLIO ET AL., supra note 82, at 178.
107 See Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, T 199-203 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008) (supporting the authors statement that in
expanding upon the Tadic case requirements that a NIAC involves organized non-state
armed groups engaged in protracted hostilities, the ICTY in this and other judgments put
forth "tests" based on several factors for whether a non-state group, which must be
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also take into account that NIACs are increasingly treated by law-
abiding states, the international community, jurists, and legal
scholars with the same rules covering IACs.'0o Thus, while IHL
traditionally operates on a strict division between the rules
applicable in international armed conflict and those not of an
international character, this bifurcation is increasingly eroding
under "new wars."l0 9 These "new wars" are characterized notably
by the sophistication and organization of transnational non-state
actors in initiating armed conflicts across multiple regions, and in
the intervention of foreign parties, which legally transforms
NIACs into IACs."o
In contrast to extant definitions of armed conflict in COW and
ACD datasets, which emphasize political contention (i.e., what we
would call belligerent parties or parties to a conflict) and battle-
death thresholds,"' we adopt IHL standards for defining armed
identifiable as such, is sufficiently organized and disciplined, possesses a command
structure, can perform operations in an organized manner, utilize military logistics, and
has the ability to speak with one voice); see COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS, supra note 67, at 1351-52 (supporting that since the first ruling in Tadic,
each judgment of the ICTY has taken this definition as a starting point. Moreover, the
more restrictive definition of NIAC in AP II, which applies to armed conflicts which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized "armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol").
108 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 1 570
(Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at http://www.icty.org
/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (stating that in assessing the minimal
threshold of intensity and duration of the conflict, the ICTY likewise included such
factors as the seriousness and spread of attacks, numbers of civilians displaced, the
weapons used, the extent of destruction and number of casualties, and, for isolated
incidents, the high degree of intensity and high level of organization for nonstate armed
groups).
109 See Mary Kaldor, In Defence ofNew, 2 INT'L J. STABILITY SECURITY & DEv. 1, I
(2013) (stating that "old wars were fought by the regular armed forces of states" and that
"[n]ew wars are fought by varying combinations of networks of state and non-state
actors").
110 See id. at 2-4 (explaining the logic and characterization of "new wars").
III Sarkees, War Distribution Over Time, supra note 49, at 1 (supporting the
author's claim that both definitions of war in the Correlates of War (COW) and the
Armed Conflict (ACD) datasets turn on battle-related fatalities and organized armed
forces using violence). COW defines war as "sustained combat involving organized
armed forces resulting in a minimum of 1,000 battle-related fatalities within a twelve
month period" and includes inter-state, extra-state, intra-state, and non-state wars). Id.
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conflicts. The most obvious virtue of this definition of war is its
universal and binding nature, the fact that it is both understood and
ratified by all of the world's nations and, as such, functions as a
consistent norm by any definition of that term, even while states
express different interpretations of the black letter law.1 2 Equally
helpful, insofar as the jus in bello comprise not only positive law
but customary rules, many with cross-cultural pedigrees."' These
norms are culturally "familiar" and historically durable.' 14 In
many cases, the durability of the law of armed conflict is due to
the fact that it has been "hard wired" into highly disparate cultural,
religious, and national traditions for centuries and, as such, has
served as a cultural as well as an international legal referent for
restraining excessive behavior during conflict."'
IHL rules comprise a veritable international infrastructure not
only of binding laws and restraining norms, but of authoritative
legal institutions, organizations, and practitioners that play a key
role in designating armed conflicts under IHL, as well as state and
other actors' compliance with the law."' That is, IHL norms are
not only a recognized international vocabulary of concepts that
pervade domestic (i.e., national security law) and international
law, they involve dedicated international organizations and
practitioners who identify the status of armed conflicts, conflict
actors and their behavior, and victims implicated in conflict, even
when hostilities are rife."' Notable organizations include the
statutorily impartial ICRC, which makes regular conflict and
compliance determinations during hostilities and is mandated
under international law to assist and protect victims of armed
112 See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, in HUMAN RIGHTS VOL. III 223, 230 (Todd Landman ed., 2010)
(discussing the "norm life cycle").
113 See JOHN KELSEY, ISLAM AND WAR: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE ETHICS 57, 69
(1993).
114 See id. at 76 (stating that "one has to recall ... cultural traditions").
1S See MICHAEL HOWARD, GEORGE ANDREOPOULOS & MARK SHULMAN, THE LAWS
OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 8-9 (1994).
116 See James Cockayne, Islam and International Humanitarian Law: From a Clash
to a Conversation Between Civilizations, 847 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 597, 622 (2002)
(stating that there is "substantial congruence between Islamic and IHL norms of conduct
in armed conflict on such diverse issues").
117 David Schlesinger, The Dangerous, Valuable Work of U.N. Peacekeepers, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-schlesinger-
endangered-peacekeepers-20140919-story.htmi.
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conflict and to safeguard IHL."'
Though COW and ACD data are certainly useful to analyze
correlates of war, our IHL-based definition of armed conflict
offers an alternative, relatively consistent, practical standard based
in universal international norms for defining and identifying armed
conflicts-even when there is not international consensus on
defining a specific conflict designation." 9  Many political
scientists, as well as legal scholars, are skeptical about the
influence of international law in international affairs, arguing that
states comply with the law only when it serves their interests. 12 0
This view also applies to Muslim states: Carle, for instance, finds
reluctance by Muslim states historically to implement international
human rights standards, for instance, and there is broad
disagreement among Muslim leaders about the compatibility
between international and Islamic law, despite a rich and often
integrated history. 12 1  Moreover, some studies have found that
Muslim states are less likely to comply with international law in
general.12 2 Yet, more recent studies indicate that armed conflict
and noncompliance by Muslim states may be complicated by the
analytical approaches used and explained by other factors such as
economic development,12 3 oil wealth,'2 4 and domestic structure.12 5
118 See, e.g., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), Operational Update, Syria:
ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent Maintain Aid Effort Amid Increased Fighting (July
17, 2012), www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/2012/syria-update-2012-07-
17.htm.
119 See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey Corn, Syria Must be Held to the Law of
War, CNN (Apr. 4, 2012), www.cnn.com/2012/04/04/opinion/blank-corn-syria-war.
120 See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005).
121 Robert Carle, Revealing and Concealing: Islamist Discourse on Human Rights, 6
HUM. RTs. REV. 122, 122-137 (2005); MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW 2-27 (2003); Cockayne, supra note 116, at 597-622.
122 See, e.g., Christine Min Wotipka & Francisco 0. Ramirez, World Society and
Human Rights: An Event History Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND
DEMOCRACY (B.A. Simmons, F. Dobbin & G. Garrett eds., 2008).
123 Mirjam E.Serli, Nils Petter Gleditsch & HAvard Strand, Why Is There So Much
Conflict in the Middle East?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 141, 142 (2005).
124 Michael L. Ross, Oil, Islam, and Women, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 107, 107-08
(2008).
125 Neilan S. Chaturvedi & Orlando Montoya, Democracy, Oil, or Religion?
Expanding Women's Rights in the Muslim World, 63 POL. & REL. 596, 597 (2013).
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These studies, taken together, raise the question of variation
among Muslim states.
Our results from the MSACC dataset echo the variation thesis
across states-and show temporal and geographical variation, as
well-in both Muslim state conflict and compliance behavior.
Moreover, we find that conflict behavior varies by conflict type:
interstate conflicts; interstate conflicts between Muslim states; and
intrastate conflicts in which Muslim states engage internal or
external non-state conflict actors. Likewise, this conflict behavior
implicates certain regions more than others; and certain countries
contribute to regional conflicts more than others. Notably, our
dataset also enables scholars to revisit the role of religion,
particularly at the state level, in armed conflict and compliance
patterns. While every religion has experienced large-scale
violence, including interstate and intrastate war,I26 research in this
area has often been associated with groups and subnational
organizations. 127 Andrej Tusicisny, for instance, finds that Islamic
groups are becoming increasingly involved in inter-civilizational
conflicts in the post-Cold War era,12 8 though recent research also
suggests that violence is not likely among states with different
cultural identities, but more common among states with similar
cultural ties (i.e., Islam vs. Islam).129  Recent analysis show that
predominantly Muslim societies are, indeed, more likely to
experience armed conflicts.' Simply put, Muslim states may be
conflict-prone for multiple reasons.'"' In any case, these and other
conflict dynamics in all of their variation are difficult to
understand, without examining conflict and compliance behavior
systematically across cases.
Thus, while IHL certainly adapts to changing circumstances,
its universal definition of armed conflict and its capacity to
encapsulate longstanding, cross-cultural, and ubiquitous sets of
126 Daniel Philpott, Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion, 3 Am. POL.
Sc. Ass'N. 505, 506 (2007).
127 See id. at 505.
128 Tusicisny, supra note 4, at 485-87.
129 Erik A. Gartzke & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Identity and Conflict: Ties that
Bind and Differences that Divide, 12 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 53, 53 (2006).
130 Monica Duffy Toft, Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil
War, 31 INT'L SEC. 97, 97 (2007) (noting that one or both parties were Muslim in 34 out
of the 42 (81%) religious civil wars between 1940 and 2000).
131 See id.
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rules and restraints for governing violent conflict over time make it
useful for establishing a baseline approach to armed conflict and
compliance behavior, particularly in the complex circumstances of
modem conflict among Muslim states.132
IV. Methodological & Theoretical Issues in Conflict
Classification
As mentioned, we adopt a universal IHL standard for defining
armed conflict for purposes of general applicability and
consistency, but also for precision-both in methodological and
theoretical terms, which we describe in more detail here. In
addition to explaining our approach for including armed conflicts
in our dataset, we address two related issues: the general
contention in and beyond quantitative conflict research in defining
war, particularly in the post-9/11 moment, in ways that have
hindered interdisciplinary research; and the subtle theoretical
implications that often underpin certain methodological
assumptions in conflict inquiry, which are too often neglected in
discussion.
We generally make two overarching moves in entering a data
point into our dataset. First, as the IHL definition of armed
conflict does not require researchers to accurately uncover or
count battle-related deaths to determine a given conflict's
inclusion in the database, we rely on the IHL standard to determine
the de facto existence of armed hostilities between states and/or
non-state actors.'33 Such a determination is made by researching a
conflict's history, analytical description, and documentation by
authoritative, nonpartisan, and credible sources among relevant
international humanitarian organizations (i.e., ICRC, U.N.-
initiated independent international commissions of inquiry, peace
treaties and other international conventions).134 We, thus, rely
upon historical, international, and national legal reports and
sources produced by various organizations and experts to
document a given armed conflict. This includes opinions by the
ICRC, mandated by the international community to monitor
conflict and compliance with the laws of war, as well as
132 See Robert Carle, Revealing and Concealing: Islamist Discourse on Human
Rights, 6 HUM. RTs. REv. 122, 122-137 (2005).
133 See ICRC, Term "Armed Conflict" in IHL, supra note 83.
134 Schlesinger, supra note 117.
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international court decisions, United Nations resolutions,
commissions, reports, authoritative human rights "on the ground"
accounts, direct reporting by credible news organizations and
human rights advocacy groups, and scholarship in international
law and international relations.
Second, after we determine whether a conflict is an armed
conflict and subsequently an IAC and/or NIAC to be included in
the dataset, we then examine each conflict for evidence of
compliance or noncompliance with IlHL, taking into account when
belligerent states became parties to relevant Conventions.
Violations were found when reliable reports (as described above)
indicate specific actions on the part of the state or organized armed
groups in direct opposition to core IHL standards. For instance,
Yemen's use of chemical weapons targeting civilians in the war
with Egypt in 1962-1970 clearly violates both Article 50 of the
Geneva Conventions, prohibiting the intentional killing of
protected persons and Additional Protocol I Article 52(1),
prohibiting the use of civilians as objects of attacks or reprisals.'
Likewise, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
(2006), the procedures the "government has decreed will govern
Hamdan's trial by commission violate these laws" i.e., Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, not to mention the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).' Noncompliance is, thus,
found per state when any party to a conflict violates the core of
ILHL, that is, the revised four Geneva Conventions of the 1949
treaty obligations for that state.'13  Reports of specific violations
are preferred over general allegations; however, general
allegations, if reasonably substantial, were also noted and paired
with alleging sources. Violations were obviously not found when
the state was not party to the IHL instruments at the time of
conflict. Specific violations were also highlighted and recorded in
our MSACC dataset, and reliable sources (consistent with those
135 Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Geneva Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art.
50 (Aug. 12, 1949); Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Geneva Convention (I) AP I
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 52(1) (June 8,
1977).
136 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006).
137 See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Sixty years of the Geneva
Conventions and the Decades Ahead, Statement Sept. I1, 2009, https://www.icrc.org/eng
/resources/documents/statement/geneva-convention-statement-091109.htm.
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already mentioned) in which violations were documented were
also cited.
Despite the helpful framework of authoritative sources,
however, the process of determining an armed conflict under IHL
is at times contentious, contradictory, and even confusing; this is
particularly true in non-international conflict cases, but can also
occur in interstate armed conflicts that change phase (from NIAC
to IAC) during ongoing fighting (e.g. Libya in March 2011).'
Classic contentious examples include the United States post 9/11
wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), which bewildered
even the U.S. Supreme Court for a period, not to mention ongoing
legal and policy debate over the entire "global war on terrorism"
apparatus.' To take recent cases of armed conflict within the
ambit of our dataset in Libya (beginning February 2011) and Syria
(beginning March 2011), respective U.N. Commissions of Inquiry
did not designate Libya as an armed conflict under IHL until June
2012 or Syria until July of 2012 (as opposition forces were
deemed insufficiently organized until this period).140 After much
138 Louise Arimatsu & Mohbuba Choudhury, The Legal Classification of the Armed
Conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, CHATHAM HOUSE 1, 18-19 (2014).
139 Between 2004 and 2008, the Supreme Court ruled against the government in a
series of landmark detainee cases that reshaped military detention policy and applied
Common Article 3 to Al Qaeda fighters. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion); Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 485 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
140 See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of
Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 17th sess., June 1, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/44, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/1 7session/A.HRC. 17.44_AUV.pdf
("[Tihe commission concluded that a non-international armed conflict had commenced
by or around 24 February 2011, bringing into play both international humanitarian law
alongside international human rights law. A separate coexisting international armed
conflict commenced with external military action pursuant to Security Council resolution
1973 [2011] for which the norms of international humanitarian law relating to
international armed conflicts are applicable."); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of
the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 19th
sess., Feb. 22, 2012, J 6, 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 ("The commission did not apply
international humanitarian law for the purposes of the report and the period covered ....
While the commission is gravely concerned that the violence in certain areas may have
reached the requisite level of intensity, it was unable to verify that the Free Syrian Army
(FSA), local groups identifying themselves as such or other anti-Government armed
groups had reached the necessary level of organization."). Legal scholars criticized this
assessment. See Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey Corn, Syria Must be Held to the Law of
War, CNN (Apr. 4, 2012), www.cnn.com/2012/04/04/opinion/blank-com-syria-war.
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criticism by legal scholars and human rights advocates, the ICRC
on July 15, 2012 finally assessed the Syrian conflict as a "non-
international armed conflict," applying IHL under the Geneva
Conventions.14 1 There were some attempts to argue that Syrian
forces had in the intervening period become sufficiently organized
for the NIAC designation.'12  Many scholars, however, identified
the U.N. based hesitancy on Syria as arising from overly
formalistic or legalistic uses of the ICJ "elements test," as well as
strong states' direct interests in influencing U.N. decision making,
and even an overabundance of caution on the part of the U.N.
Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in its dubious oversight of
IHL.143  These recent examples indicate the need to carefully
include multiple, authoritative, and independent sources in making
armed conflict determinations. In keeping with the neutral,
humanitarian purpose of the IHL de facto armed conflict standard
and for purposes of rigorous data collection, we have tried to strip
out all state or organizational interests from conflict status
determination if and when that occurs.
This methodological issue, however, signals potential
problems of conflict classification that scholars must recognize.
Scholars must make sure to assess and interpret the full range of
available materials on a given conflict and, ultimately, defer to the
facts on the ground as they become available. In the case of
current or ongoing wars, such facts may be difficult to divine,
given the limits of direct information, and the expulsion or
departure of humanitarian groups, U.N. agencies, and/or
journalists during violent or politicized hostilities-though
141 See Eric C. Sigmund, ICRC Confirms International Humanitarian Law Applies
to Conflict in Syria, AM. RED CROSS BLOG (July 15, 2012), http://redcrosschat.org/
2012/07/15/icrc-confirms-international-humanitarian-law-applies-to-conflict-in-syria/
(announcing the ICRC's assessment of Syria as a NIAC on July 15, 2012). In the Syrian
example, pessimistic views of the limits of international law in the face of strong states'
interests are on strong display, as are the role of intergovernmental organizations at work
in the course of characterizing armed conflicts.
142 Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Internal Conflicts or Other Situations of
Violence-What is the Diference for Victims?, Interview Oct. 12, 2012,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2012/12-10-niac-non-
international-armed-conflict.htn.
143 Daphne Richemond-Barak, The Human Rights Council and the Convergence of
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in SHAPING A GLOBAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 3, 18 (William
C. Banks ed., 2012).
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reputable human rights analysts often persevere during intense
danger often at great personal risk.1" Citizen journalism and
social media venues have, likewise, expanded coverage of
hostilities in ways that is playing an increasing role in conflict
characterization.'45 Thus, during the "fog of war" the de facto
standard, not to mention a reliance on detailed accounts of the
fighting, help to keep analytical assessments relatively honest and
accurate--even when the results run against the grain of powerful
actors' preferences or the collective consciousness of the
international community.14 6 In this respect, we take the broadest
range of expert opinion and direct reporting into account to
determine difficult, politicized, or close call cases of armed
conflict in order to abide by the IHL de.facto standard. We, thus,
coded Libya as a NIAC in February 2011, for instance, when state
military forces used lethal force to intervene in the conflict, which
eventually became an IAC later that same year (with Security
Council resolution 1973 and the intervention of other state
parties); and we coded Syria as a NIAC in March 2011, again,
when state and non-state forces showed unmistakable signs of
organized intervention with lethal force and when hostilities
achieved obvious intensity by evidence of large scale government
force mobilization across the country and consistent,
indiscriminate shelling of civilians and Free Syrian Army
combatants. 147
A. Differences between MSACC and Other Datasets:
Theoretical Considerations
It is also critical to address the substantive, theoretical issues
that often hover on the margins of methodological considerations
in formal conflict inquiry. This is to say, there has been discussion
of the logistical limits of battle-death thresholds'4 8 without,
perhaps, equal conceptual discussion of the implicit ad hoc
144 Schlesinger, supra note 117.
145 See Heather Blake, War Reporting and the Rise of Citizen Journalism, SECURITY
IN TRANSITION (June 12 2013), http://www.securityintransition.org/commentaries/war-
reporting-and-the-rise-of-citizen-journalism/.
146 Id.
147 See SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW, SYRIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT,
http://www.iamsyria.org/uploads/1/3/0/2/13025755/syria-sapgeneraloverview.pdf.
148 Nicholas Sambanis, What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities
of an Operational Definition, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 814, 816 (2004).
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theories of conflict embedded in such criterion and practices.'4 9
Even within the confines of defining war as first and foremost an
act of violence,' rather than, for instance, an act of politics that
uses organized violence-there are other measures beyond battle
deaths that may better indicate war: namely, the capacity and
willingness of conflicting parties to mobilize state and/or non-state
armed forces.'s Moreover, sustained combat and combat-related
deaths, while important, may not amount in every case to the most
salient indicator of armed conflict-state forces amassing and
crossing borders, civilian displacement and numbers of refugees,
even the general immiseration of internal populations may be
equally important indicators of war.'52 Accordingly, simply
adding other specifying factors (i.e. sustained combat, opposing
forces) does not fully reckon with the question of whether 25 or
1,000 battlefield deaths during acts of political violence on its own
merits the descriptors "armed conflict" or "war."153
By contrast, we preserve a sense of the qualitative difference
of war captured in legal norms and, further, approach that
149 The COW project defines war as hinging upon two primary criteria: (1) threshold
of battle-related fatalities of troops in combat, namely, 1,000 battle-related deaths within
a 12 month period as a "level of hostilities" that differentiates war from other types of
conflict; and (2) the status of war participants in which wars must "have participants on
both sides that had organizations able to conduct combat." See MEREDITH REID
SARKEES, THE COW TYPOLOGY OF WAR: DEFINING AND CATEGORIZING WARS (VERSION
4 OF THE DATA) (2010). Relatedly, the ACD Dataset defines "armed conflict," albeit
with a lower threshold of battle-deaths, as "a contested incompatibility which concerns
government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which
at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" per
year and per incompatibility. Nils Gleditsch et al., UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
v.4-2012, 1946-2011, UPSALA UNIVERSITET (2013), http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/
ucdp/datasets/ucdpprioarmedconflictdataset/ [hereinafter ACD dataset]; see also
Definitions, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/ (last
visited Nov. 11, 2014).
ise See MEREDITH REID SARKEES, THE COW TYPOLOGY OF WAR: DEFINING AND
CATEGORIZING WARS (VERSION 4 OF THE DATA) (2010).
15, See Victoria Butenko, Laura Smith-Spark & Diana Magnay, US. Official Says
1,000 Russian Troops Have Entered Ukraine, CNN WORLD (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/28/world/europe/ukraine-crisis/.
152 Id.; Ann M. Simmons, Ukranian Refugees on Edge as They Flood into Russia,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-ukraine-
refugees-20140913-story.html#page= 1.
153 See, e.g., Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War and the
Notion ofArmed Conflict-A Tentative Conceptualization, 873 INT'L. REV. RED CROSS
95, 103-08 (2009).
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difference systemically consistent with the aim of international law
itself: namely, to understand war as a systemic threat to collective
peace and security. In the MSACC dataset under the IHL
definition of armed conflict, for instance, many ACD armed
conflict data points (i.e., incompatibilities that record at least 25
deaths per year) would not count as armed conflicts, as these
incidents would be instead defined as examples of domestic strife,
riots and/or protests that may include 25 violence-related deaths,
but would not meet the fighting intensity and force organization
tests required of NIACs.15 4  For example, ACD records as an
armed conflict a period of religious strife in Nigeria in 2004,
where there was cyclical fighting between Christian and Muslim
groups at religious sites, resulting in several hundred deaths and
sparking a Presidential declaration of emergency and a follow-on
peace process.' This conflict, because it did not indicate
organized forces or intensity in fighting, was not defined as a
NIAC in the MSACC dataset. For the same reason, the Green
Revolution in Iran in 2009-2010 is likewise not found in the
MSACC, but included in ACD data. There, crowds across the
country mobilized in protest against what was believed to be
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rigged reelection, with
estimated deaths of over 18 protestors (with over 1,000
arrested).' The ACD also designates the Syrian coup d'6tat of
1966 as an internal conflict with 25 (or more) deaths on February
23, 1966.'" We found dozens of sources describing the events
associated with the coup as bloody, with several sources calling it
the "bloodiest" coup in Syria since 1949.'"
Further, because we do not typify wars beyond their
determination as an IAC or NIAC, we do not face some of the
elaborate or even counterintuitive classification schema problems
as to whether a given armed conflict is, for instance, extra-
154 The Macro Data Guide, NSD, http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.
html?id=55&sub-1 (last visited Oct. 7, 2014).
155 See Resolution on Nigeria, AFRICAN CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & HUM. RTs. STUD.
(May 20, 2004), http://www.acdhrs.org/2004/05/.
156 Dieter Bednarz, End of the Green Revolution? The Power of Iran's Iron Fist,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/end-
of-the-green-revolution-the-power-of-iran-s-iron-fist-a-633144.html.
157 Id.
158 SYRIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 37-40 (Thomas Collelo ed., 3rd ed. 1988).
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systemic or intrastate.159 By our criteria, COW categories of
"extra-systemic" wars and "intrastate" wars would simply be
categorized as NIACs.6 0 Moreover, the nature of this seemingly
simple categorical distinction matters in ways that have
theoretical-and not only empirical-implications."' For
instance, COW categorizes the case of the U.S. armed intervention
in the Dominican Republic in 1965, a war in which the U.S.
military placed 42,000 Marines on the ground, as an "intra-state"
conflict (#766), defined as "wars that predominantly take place
within the recognized territory of a state." 62 While this event does
59 Gleditsch, Armed Conflict 1946-2001, supra note 34, at 619 (explaining
international wars are classified as either "inter-state," those in which a territorial state or
member of the interstate system is engaged in a war with another system member, and
"extra-systemic" wars, those in which an interstate system member is engaged in a war
with a political entity which is not a system member); UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, supra note
149 (defining civil wars as any armed conflict involving: (1) military action internal to
the metropole of the state; (2) the active participation of the national government; (3)
effective resistance by both sides; and (4) a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths each year
of the conflict, but it is important to note that extra-systemic wars can resemble civil
wars insofar as they can occur internally); see THE WAGES OF WAR, supra note 34
(defining further the two types of international war); see also RESORT TO ARMS supra
note 71 (explaining Small and Singer's updated data, which also includes civil war data).
160 See MEREDITH REID SARKEES, THE COW TYPOLOGY OF WAR: DEFINING AND
CATEGORIZING WARS (VERSION 4 OF THE DATA) 2-6 (2010) (discussing changes in COW
conflict definitions).
161 See generally infra Table 2.
162 MEREDITH REID SARKEES, CODEBOOK FOR THE INTRA-STATE WARS v. 4.0.,
DEFINITIONS AND VARIABLES 2 (2010) (noting that in addition to the "effective
resistance" criteria within the COW typology, an intra-state war must meet all the same
definitional requirements of wars). Moreover, the expanded COW typology of intra-
state wars is subdivided into three types, based upon what COW calls "combatant status"
(i.e., party to the conflict status): civil wars involve the government of the state against a
non-state entity; regional internal wars involve the government of a regional subunit
against a non-state entity; and inter-communal wars involve combat with two or more
non-state entities within the state. Id. Civil wars have then been subdivided further into
two types: those for control of the central government, and those involving disputes over
local issues. See THE WAGES OF WAR, supra note 34, at 215 (defining the central
government as forces in de facto control at the start of the war). Control of the nation's
institutions need not necessarily include control of the armed forces, since in a civil war
the armed forces may actually be fighting against the government. Id. In such cases the
government must rely on civilian combatants or other branches of the civilian or military
infrastructure that remain loyal. Id. Consequently, Small and Singer also included in the
general category of "the government," or the side of the national government, all those-
from national military forces to local police, and citizens-who enter the conflict in the
name of that government. See id. The non-state participants in intra-state wars can be a
variety of types of actors, including: regional geopolitical units (GPUs), and non-
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not appear in our Muslim-state focused dataset, under our legal
definition of war, this is clearly a Common Article 2 IAC (i.e.
interstate war) and, in this case, a clear-cut occupation situation,
one that incidentally involved the rapid deployment of thousands
of highly-trained specialized forces in the midst of domestic
political instability in the context of an underdeveloped Island
nation matched against a powerful, foreign aggressor.'63 It does
not matter that Dominican Republic state forces-all 4,000 of
them-largely and wisely chose not to fight back which, on the
COW model's criteria of "active resistance," prompts its exclusion
as an interstate war.'" Certainly, the reticence of the Dominican
Republic's military to resist overwhelming force does not make
this incident any less an occupation situation or a war between
states. 65  As circumspect realist Kenneth Waltz points out in
another context, non-bloody occupation situations do not mean
that peace (democratic or otherwise) reigns supreme. '6
Moreover, to characterize this intervention as an internal
conflict-surely the Dominican Republic cannot occupy itself-
stretches the descriptive power of such conflict typologies beyond
their empirical utility and in ways that may undermine their
explanatory (theoretical) power.16 7 If occupation situations can be
empirically defined as internal wars, this raises fundamental
questions about the IR theory-wittingly or not-embedded in
standard conflict data.'16  That is, if we designate the 1965 U.S.
territorial entities (NTEs) or non-state armed groups (NSAs) that have no defined
territorial base. Id. As with all categories of war, for a state to be considered a war
participant, the minimum requirement is that it has to either commit 1,000 troops to the
war or suffer 100 battle-related deaths. Id. Since non-state armed groups are generally
smaller than states and have fewer resources, we have adopted a more minimalist
requirement for a non-state actor to be considered a war participant.
163 ICRC, Term "Armed Conflict" in IHL, supra note 83, at 1.
164 SARKEES, supra note 162, at 2.
165 See id.
166 Kenneth Waltz & James Fearon, A Conversation with Kenneth Waltz, 15 ANN.
REv. POL. SCi. 1, 7-12 (2012).
167 See ICRC, Term "Armed Conflict" in IHL, supra note 83, at 2 ("Apart from
regular, inter-state armed conflicts, Additional Protocol I extends the definition of IAC to
include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination, alien
occupation or racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination (wars of
national liberation).").
168 Waltz & Fearon, supra note 166, at 11-12 (arguing in a 2012 interview on
changing international norms of intervention that neither norms nor state behavior have
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intervention and occupation of the Dominican Republic as an
internal war-a war incidentally, that is still reaping political and
regional consequences today-we fundamentally distort the
political nature of this war and misunderstand U.S. interests in
intervention."' More perniciously, do we import into our
purportedly social scientificodata subtle justifications of strategic
power that even hardboiled realists would reject?'
B. Comparing ACD and MSACC Data: Common Patterns
and Differences at a Glance
Given this discussion, we now demonstrate in data results
some of the differences between MSACC and ACD data as a point
of comparison: Figure 1 shows the numbers of intrastate wars
coded by MSACC and ACD, respectively, while Figure 2
compares the numbers of interstate wars for the respective
datasets. "' In order to facilitate comparison of the data, we
combined ACD's three NIAC conflict types, extra-systemic (E-
NIACs), internationalized (I-NIACs), and internal (NIACs), into a
single "NIAC" conflict type and extracted only those conflicts
under ACD in which an OIC member participated in conflict. In
comparing IACs between OIC members under ACD, we defined
an IAC between OIC states based only on the two primary dyads
and did not consider secondary dyads.
"changed much" since the Cold War). Rather, "we may be more aware of norms that
especially the United States does not obey," as "it's hard to think of any other country
that's as interventionist as the United States"-so much so that "[w]e don't even notice
that we intervene." Id. Kenneth Waltz then asks, "How many people remember that we
invaded the Dominican Republic in 1965?" and goes on to explain that "[i]t just doesn't
exist in the American memory." Id. Though, "I'm sure," Waltz continues,."it does in
the Dominican Republic, I'm sure they remember it! We put 23,000 troops in the
Dominican Republic, which is of course a larger military body than the Dominican
Republic itself could muster. Id. So naturally it fits right in with 'democracies don't
fight wars,' because if you're a really powerful democracy, you don't need to fight wars.
You just occupy the country. Id. They're not going to fight back." Id. See also
generally JUNOT DIAz, THE BRIEF WONDROUS LIFE OF OSCAR WAO (2007) (capturing this
discrepant history, ironically, in fiction, in a Pulitzer-prize winning novel set against the
backdrop of this U.S. occupation-but not in our standard social science datasets).
169 Waltz & Fearon, supra note 166, at 13.
170 Id.
171 See infra Figure 1 & Figure 2 (recoding extra-systemic wars and
internationalized intra-state wars in the ACD dataset as intra-state wars); ACD dataset,
supra note 149.
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In Figure 1, both MSACC and ACD have the same pattern in
intrastate wars for Muslim actors over time-decrease, increase,
then decrease-but the ACD dataset indicates a more precipitous
decline in intrastate wars for Muslim states up to the Islamic
Revolution (1979) period, whereas the MSACC data shows a more
dynamic pattern coordinated with key historical events, including,
the Islamic Revolution. 172 It is important to note, however, that the
number of intrastate (and interstate) conflicts in the MSACC
dataset is largely higher than those identified in the ACD (the
ACD is lower in three time frames, but higher in one time
frame).17' This discrepancy is somewhat surprising given the
lower threshold for determining both intrastate and interstate
armed conflicts in the ACD, which would mean that the ACD data
should find more (not less) overall armed conflicts than the
MSACC data. 174  Nevertheless, in both datasets, Figure 1
illustrates a consonance in findings over time and after the Islamic
Revolution period: that is, despite the different standards for
identifying NIACs, Muslim states appear to be more conflict prone
in the post-Islamic Revolution period, but less conflict prone in the
Cold War and post-Cold War period up through the September 11,
2001-2014 period.
Figure 2 shows that-in contrast to intrastate conflicts-the
number of MSACC interstate conflicts is always higher than those
identified in the ACD data. This finding is interesting given, as
mentioned, the ACD lower threshold for determining an armed
conflict, so that one would expect the ACD numbers to be
consistently higher (not lower) for both interstate and intrastate
categories.17s An important contravening factor is that the ACD
records far longer dates for wars than the MSACC dataset does,
thus, resulting in what would be recorded as multiple wars under
the legal definition pressed together into one armed conflict
designation under the ACD. For example, ACD coded the conflict
between Iran and Iraq, from 1974 to 1988, as one 14 yearlong
172 See infra Figure 1; see also ACD dataset, supra note 149 (focusing on patterns of
Muslim states in armed conflicts).
173 See ACD dataset, supra note 149 (focusing on patterns of Muslim states in
armed conflicts); see infra Figure 1.
174 See generally Sarkees, Codebook, supra note 71 (defining components of
interstate and intrastate wars).
175 See infra Figure 1.
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conflict,'76 whereas MSACC coded these hostilities as two
separate wars: one from 1972-1975 and the other from 1980-1988.
Another example occurs in Uganda, where ACD identified one
conflict from 1971 to 2013,1'7 whereas MSACC treated this 40
plus year period as including six separate conflicts (in some cases
including different belligerents). Still another example is in
Pakistan, where ACD coded a conflict with India in the Kashmir
region from 1948 to 2003 as a single 55-year long conflict,'
whereas MSACC criteria define two separate interstate conflicts
during this long period. In these examples it is not simply a matter
of dividing conflicts according to different notions of start and end
dates, but whether a given conflict actually meets the legal
threshold during the period. In Pakistan and India, for instance, we
determined that no conflict existed under international law during
the conflict period of 1984 through 1992.
Beyond different coding rules, Figure 2 also shows that while
both datasets indicate that interstate wars largely declined over the
same total period, the number of interstate conflicts under an IHL-
based definition fluctuated (from 25 to 9, and from 9 to 8 wars) in
each successive period.' Since our definition of interstate
conflict has a higher threshold than that of ACD, we speculate that
while Muslim states engaged in defacto armed hostilities after the
Iranian Revolution, they had a tendency to avoid large-scale
fighting, which is reflected in the lower number of ACD
conflicts.'" Overall, Figures 1 and 2 indicate that the MSACC and
ACD data reflect similar conflict patterns, but indicate some
important differences in how Muslim states engage in conflicts
over time.'8 ' Notably, it appears that the MSACC data may be
more sensitive in picking up a larger number of conflicts involving
Muslim state actors. 182
176 ACD dataset, supra note 149, at Conflict ID #128.
177 Id. at Conflict ID #1 18.
178 Id. at Conflict ID #20.
179 See infra Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Comparison in NIACs between MSACC and ACD
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Figure 3: Comparison in totals between MSA CC and A CD
datasets
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As the aggregate results may be difficult to interpret, we
briefly relay a case study to demonstrate an example of these
definitional differences in more detail. For this exercise, we have
chosen three countries from the same region to control for regional
fixed effects. Based on the MSACC data, we selected the most
conflict-prone, the least conflict-prone, and the intermediary
conflict-prone countries from the Middle East region: Yemen,
Oman, and Jordan, respectively."'
Table 1: List of Conflicts in Yemen, Jordan, and Oman by
ACD and MSACC
ACD MSAC Start End
Country Opponents Type Type Year Year
Yemenite
Yemen Socialist Party NIAC NIAC 1986 1986
Yemen Royalists NIAC NIAC 1962 1970
Democratic
Republic of
Yemen Yemen NIAC NIAC 1994 1994
Yemen FLOSY NIAC IAC 1964 1967
183 See infra Table 1.
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Total in NIACs NIACs
Jordan: 2 IACs 3 IACS
Oman PFLO NIAC NIAC 1969 1975
Oman Gulf War IAC n/a 1990 1991
State of
Oman/Free
Oman Oman NIAC n/a 1957 1957
Total 2 1
in NIACs NIACs
Oman: 1 IACs 0 IACs
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Table I summarizes all the conflicts for Yemen, Jordan, and
Oman to highlight distinctions in the datasets indicated in using an
IHL-based definition of armed conflict. There are multiple
instances in which conflicts included in the ACD dataset are not
included in the MSACC data and vice versa. The Jordan conflict
in 1970-1971, in which King Hussein mobilized state forces
against armed Palestinian guerillas, is an example of a recorded
NIAC in the MSACC data, but not in the ACD.18 4 In this example,
Palestinian Fedayeen guerillas were an organized armed group
with a centralized command structure who gained control of
several key strategic positions in Jordan, such as the oil refinery
near Az Zarqa.'"5 When the group successfully hijacked several
planes within hours of each other, King Hussein initialized martial
law countrywide and began an intensive civil war to expel the
guerilla fighters from Jordan.' The fighting caused extensive
damage throughout Jordan and resulted in approximately 3,500
deaths on both sides (ACD still does not include this conflict in its
dataset though it meets their battle-death standard).' 7
There are also differences between the datasets in determining
whether a conflict is an IAC or NIAC. For example, wars of
independence in which previously ruled colonies overthrow their
colonizing powers are classified as IACs as per Common Article
2,'8 but ACD classifies these cases as NIACs, which in certain
ways is more intuitive.'" Ultimately we believe the Geneva
standard better theoretically captures these distinctive cases of
colonial war in which an apparent internal conflict actually
involves two (or more) state belligerents, even if one is an
incipient state.' 90  Yemen in 1964-1967, for instance, gained
independence from Britain, which is classified in the MSACC data
184 Compare supra Table 1, with ACD dataset, supra note 149 (omitting 1970-1971
conflict with Palestine).




188 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 74, art. 2.
189 Lotta Themner, UCDP/PIRO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, UPSALA
CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM 1, 9(4th ed. 2014).
190 See Geneva Convention 1, supra note 74, art. 2.
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as an IAC,'9 ' whereas ACD defines this example as a NIAC.192
With these elementary definitional differences in mind, we
now turn to describe general conflict trends among Muslim states
using MSACC data.
V. Muslim State Conflict Trends over Region, Time, and
Conflict Type
Using simple bivariate analysis, we show broad-based conflict
patterns for all Muslim states-including all intrastate and
interstate conflicts and those interstate conflicts between
exclusively Muslim state belligerents. As mentioned, the MSACC
conflict data shows overall variation in armed conflict behavior
across space and time. This dataset also includes IHL compliance
per conflict and belligerent, but given space constraints here we
only mention descriptive statistical findings from the compliance
side of the research data.
Of the total 196 independent states in the world, 56 are
members of OIC.'9 Over the 67 year time frame tracked in the
MSACC dataset from 1947-2014 (until March), taken together,
these 56 member states participated in 121 armed conflicts: 70
NIACs and 51 IACs, including 22 JACs between Muslim states
(MM-JAC).194 NIACs made up the majority of modern conflicts,
affirming conflict findings for all states in the post-World War II
period.195
Of all Muslim states, only ten were not involved in any
significant conflicts as primary belligerents during the period:
Benin and Gabon in Africa; Guyana in the Americas; Brunei-
Darussalam, Kazakhstan, the Maldives and Turkmenistan in Asia;
and Bahrain, Qatar, and the U.A.E. in the Middle East.' The
191 See supra Table 1.
192 Themner, supra note 189, at 9.
193 See OIC Member States, supra note 8. But see Member States of the United
Nations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/#p (last visited Oct. 3, 2014)
(enumerating 193 independent states recognized by the United Nations, whereas the
Holy Sea (Vatican), the Cook Islands, and the Niue added to this total amounts to 196
states).
194 See infra Table 2 and Figure 5.
195 See infra Figure 5.
196 There were numerous instances of states participating in coalition forces, not all
of which were included in our dataset. Only participation in coalition forces that
involved effective control was included, and in order to determine whether that
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remaining 46 countries were involved in 121 total conflicts, an
average of 2.63 conflicts per country in the framing period. Of
this group of 46 states participating in 121 conflicts, those states
involved in the most conflicts (in descending order) were: Yemen
(12); Iraq (10); Egypt (8); Uganda (7); Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Somalia, Saudi Arabia, and Syria (6). The states involved in the
fewest conflicts were: Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia,
Suriname, Malaysia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Albania, and Oman,
all of which were only involved in one conflict.
As mentioned, of the 121 total conflicts, NIACs make up 70
conflicts, IACs account for 51 conflicts, and of those 51 IACs, 22
occurred between exclusively Muslim states. Thus, the percentage
of total IACs between two or more Muslim states is 43 percent (in
contrast to 57 percent of IACs occurring between Muslim states
and non-Muslim state belligerents).1 7  While the MSACC data
confirms that NIACs represent a larger share of post-World War II
conflicts in total, it also shows that interstate conflicts involving
participation qualified as an armed conflict for the country, we began with the attribution
of the actions of a non-state group to a state and extended international tribunals'
thresholds onto the actions of states when supporting other states. The International
Court of Justice has found that the state must exercise effective control over the armed
group in order to attribute the armed group's actions to the state. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 181
(June 27). The International Criminal Court (ICC) has found that in the conflict between
the Democratic Republic of Congo and non-state groups, Uganda's substantial
contribution of troops, weapons and ammunition to armed groups were substantial
grounds to believe the conflict was between states. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06 (Mar. 14, 2012), available at www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838
.pdf; see Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 (Mar. 7, 2014), available at
www.icc-cpi.int/icedocs/doc/docl744366.pdf. Therefore, in our dataset, because
coalition partners do not necessarily operate separately, coordinating plans and inter-
mingling troops, in cases of conflicts where states acted together, we determined to the
best of our ability, what states, if any, exercised effective control over another state.
Factors that were used to define effective control included: chain of command; troop
strength; logistics like providing arms; extensive monetary support; and initiating
hostilities rather than supporting hostilities. The states that exercised effective control
over the conflict, termed "main belligerents," have the conflict listed under that state,
whereas the states that did not exercise effective control over the conflict, termed
"supporting states," do not list that conflict under that state. Frequently, the United
States, whose commanders often hold top leadership positions within the coalition
structure, is a main belligerent and smaller states, such as the U.A.E. and Qatar during
the Gulf War, are merely supporting states, typically only contributing forces or bases or
conducting training of native troops.
197 See infra Figure 4.
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exclusively Muslim states do not outpace mixed-state interstate
conflicts.'9 8  This finding is somewhat deceptive, however,
because when combinging the 43 percent of exclusively Muslim-
state IACs with the percentage of NIACs (intrastate conflicts
involving predominantly Muslim state and non-state actors), the
actual number is closer to 92 conflicts out of the total 121.199
Aggregating Muslim-state IACs with NIACs, the percentage of
conflicts involving Muslim actors (states and non-states) with
respect to total conflicts is 76 percent.200
Figure 4: Proportion of IA Cs
MSACC IAC & MM IAC
w IAC IAC MM
We now disaggregate these findings over time and across
space. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive analyses. To show the
trends visually, the following subsections give more detailed
description of the conflict behavior of Muslim states by using
some additional figures.
198 See infra Figure 5.
199 See infra Figure 4, Figure 5, Table 2.
200 See infra Table 2.
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Table 2: Summary of Conflict Behavior by Muslim States over
Time and across Regions
Cold War Islamic Berlin Sep 11 Total
(1947- Rev Wall (2001-
1978) (1979- (1989- 2012)
1988) 2001)
flict N % N % N % N % N
9 36 4 44 2
0 0 0 0 0
5 20 1 11 1
0 0 0 0 1












































Total 22 100 10 100 22 100 17 100 68 100
25 100 9 100 9 100 8 100 50 100
2 22 3 60 2 33 1 50 8 36
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 14
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 44 2 40 4 6 1 50 11 50
9 100 5 100 6 100 2 100 22 100
7 32 7 70 13 59 10 59 37 51
0 0 1 10 0 0 0 0 1 1
4 18 0 0 4 18 2 12 10 13
1 5 0 0 1 5 0 0 2 3
10 45 2 20 4 18 5 29 21 31
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A. Geographical Patterns
We grouped conflict behavior by Muslim states according to
geographical region, using relatively standard regional boundary
definitions also used by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (ACD)
to facilitate comparisons among datasets. 201 The geographical
regions are: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle
East.202 Figure 5 provides a summary of our findings on conflicts
for Muslim states, including the proportion of TACs that involve
exclusively Muslim state belligerents.
Figure 5: Overall Totals by Region
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1. Africa
In Africa, there are 27 OIC member states involved in a total
201 See ACD dataset, supra note 149.
202 See infra Figure 5 (designating the following regions: Africa (which includes
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti,
Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, and
Uganda); the Americas (Guyana and Suriname); Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brunei-
Darussalam, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan); Europe (Albania and Azerbaijan); and the Middle East
(Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen)); see Composition of
Macro Geographical (Continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-regions, and Selected
Economic and Other Groupings, U.N. STATISTICS DIv. (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm.
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of 55 conflicts. Benin and Gabon were not involved in any
conflicts. Of the 55 total armed conflicts, 19 were IACs and 36
were NIACs. In the case of the IACs, Somalia participated in the
highest number of conflicts at four, while three states-Chad,
Libya, and Morocco-participated as primary belligerents in three
conflicts each. IACs involving exclusively Muslim state
belligerents totaled 8.
In the case of the NIACs, Uganda accounted for the largest
number of NIACs at 6, and Nigeria and Sudan were responsible
for the next highest number of recorded internal wars, with a total
of 3 each. Consistent with the literature, NIACs make up the vast
majority of the conflicts in the African region, 65.45 percent,
while 34.55 percent are JACs. Of the 19 IACs, 8 conflicts were
between two or more Muslim states exclusively, while 11 of the
IACs were between a Muslim and non-Muslim state. Chad, for
instance, engaged in conflicts with Nigeria, Libya, and Sudan, all
Muslim state-versus-Muslim state conflicts.
In general, the international conflicts in the African region
were African-centric. That is, no Muslim state in the African
region was involved in an IAC with another Muslim state outside
the African region, though states in the African region were
involved in conflicts with non-Muslim states outside of the region,
mostly in the decolonization context. In percentage points, of the
IACs, 42.11 percent were between two or more Muslim-majority
states, and as mentioned, all of those conflicts were with countries
in the African region.
We conclude that modern armed conflict among Muslim states
in Africa is extremely regional and Africa-centric, internal wars or
NIACs significantly outpace IACs (almost double the percentage),
and IACs between exclusively Muslim state belligerents
predominate.
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2. Americas
In the Americas, which include North, South, and Central
America, there are two Muslim states: Guyana and Suriname.
Guyana recorded no significant conflicts, while Suriname was
involved in one NIAC with the Surinamese Liberation Army
during 1986-1988. The total conflicts in the Americas were, thus,
one, namely, one NIAC and no IACs.
3. Asia
In the Asian region, there are eleven Muslim states:
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brunei-Darussalam, Indonesia,
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Maldives, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Of this group, four-Brunei-
Darussalam, Kazakhstan, the Maldives, and Turkmenistan-
recorded no armed conflicts. Of the 18 total conflicts that
occurred in the Asia region, 10 were NIACs and 8 were IACs. Of
those IACs, 3 involved exclusively (two or more) Muslim state
belligerents: namely, the conflicts between Afghanistan and
Pakistan; between Bangladesh and Pakistan; and between
Indonesia and Malaysia. Afghanistan and Pakistan engaged in the
most armed conflicts at 6 each; Afghanistan with 3 IACs and 3
NIACs and Pakistan with 4 IACs and 2 NIACs. Indonesia engaged
in 4 conflicts, 2 IACs and 2 NIACs, and Bangladesh engaged in 2
conflicts, 1 IAC and 1 NIAC. In contrast to Africa, in the Asia
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region IACs and NIACs were almost evenly split in number, and
all but two IACs, Afghanistan versus the Soviet Union (1979-
1989) and Afghanistan versus the U.S.-led NATO coalition (2001-
2002), were between belligerents who were located in the Asia
region. The Asia region had two states that ranked in the top ten
conflict-prone states: Afghanistan and Pakistan, which both logged
6 conflicts.
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WALL
4. Europe
In the European region, there are two Muslim states: Albania
and Azerbaijan. Albania was involved in one NIAC, and
Azerbaijan was involved in one NIAC and one IAC against
Armenia. Thus there were a total of 3 conflicts for Europe, 2
NIACs and 1 IAC; furthermore, there were no European armed
conflicts involving exclusively Muslim state belligerents.
731
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.






6 M IAC total
4 IAC MM
2 * MSAC IAC non MM
COLD ISLAMIC BERLIN Sep-11
WAR REV WALL
5. Middle East
In the Middle East region, there are a total of 16 Muslim states,
which engaged in a total of 44 conflicts: 21 of those conflicts were
NIACs and 23 were IACS. In the Middle East, interestingly, IACs
outrank NIACs, atypical for any of the other regions and for
general Muslim state conflict trends. The Middle East, that is,
remains the only region in which international armed conflicts
outpace internal armed conflicts.
Yemen recorded the highest number of conflicts, with 12: 7
IACs and 5 NIACs. Iraq recorded the second highest number of
conflicts at 10: 7 IACs and 3 NIACs. Egypt engaged in 8
conflicts: 6 IACs and 2 NIACs. Saudi Arabia and Syria both were
involved in 6 conflicts each: Saudi Arabia had 6 IACs while Syria
had 4 IACs and 2 NIACs. Of the 23 total IACs in the Middle East,
less than half, 11, were between exclusively Muslim state
belligerents but all of those Muslim state belligerents were located
in the Middle East region. The remaining 12 IACs included one
Middle East-based Muslim state belligerent and at least one non-
Muslim state belligerent such as Israel, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Over half the IACs in the Middle East region
involved Western states. NIACs account for 45 percent of the
conflicts in the Middle East.
In the Middle East region, then, IACs buck the trend and
outrank NIACs, conflicts that involve exclusively Muslim state
actors make up over 47 percent of IACs and 57 percent of all
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conflicts, and conflicts largely, 72 percent, tend to occur inside the
region.
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B. Overall Regional Trends
The lion's share of armed conflicts belongs to the Africa
region, which saw a total of 55 armed conflicts, comprised of 19
IACs (8 of which were exclusively between Muslim states) and 36
NIACs in the framing period. The total Africa region conflicts
compare with the other highly-ranked conflict regions as follows:
44 Middle East total conflicts, including 21 NIACs, 23 IACs, and
11 IACs between Muslim states; 18 total conflicts in the Asia
region, including 10 NIACs, 8 IACs, and 3 IACs between Muslim
states. By contrast, Europe had 1 IAC and 2 NIACs and the
Americas recorded only 1 NIAC.
In the case of Africa, most conflicts are NIACs, as mentioned,
with 36 NIACs versus 19 IACs, but of the IACs, 8 were conflicts
involving exclusively Muslim state belligerents. The other 11
IACs involved at least one non-Muslim state. However, 3 of those
11 IACs between Muslim and non-Muslim states were
decolonization struggles in which the subsequent formal Muslim
state won independence from a former governing colonial power:
Algeria and France; Morocco and France; Tunisia and France.
The African region, moreover, illustrates emphatically the regional
nature of Muslim state armed conflict and that conflicts appear,
that is, in regional groupings. No African state was involved in a
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conflict outside of the region.
This regional trend in conflict occurrence involving
exclusively Muslim state parties within the same region is evident
across other geographical regions. In the Middle East, for
instance, of the 11 IACs among two or more exclusively Muslim
state belligerents, all were limited to the Middle East. Likewise, in
the Asia region, armed conflicts were divided almost equally
between IACs and NIACs, but every interstate conflict involving
two or more Muslim states was confined to the Asia region.
This "in-region" armed conflict trend for Muslim state
belligerents may dominate for several reasons, some obvious:
proximity, as states in the same region have easier access to each
other's borders and natural resources, and hence, are more apt to
be engaged in disputes over these items. But it is also true that
there are more Muslim states in many of these regions (i.e. Africa,
Middle East) so it is more likely that conflicts occurring in Africa
involve Muslim states. More interestingly, the prevalent conflict
type-IAC or NIAC-was, likewise, similar by region: in Africa,
the majority, 65.45 percent of the 55 conflicts were NIACs,
whereas in the Middle East, the majority of conflicts were IACs:
52.27 percent. Likewise, in Asia, 55.56 percent of the 18 conflicts
were NIACs.
C Temporal Patterns
In examining how conflicts (i.e., NIAC or IAC) change over
time, we find that IACs-between mixed states and between only
Muslim states-generally decreased over time with a slight
increase in Muslim versus Muslim (MM) IACs between 1989 and
2001, whereas NIACs revealed a much more dynamic pattern:
decreasing, increasing, and then decreasing again over time. We
separated the conflict data into four periods divided by significant
historical, political, and/or global events, namely: the Cold War
and the decolonization era from 1947-1978; the Post-Islamic
Revolution era of conflicts, from 1979-1988; the fall of the Berlin
Wall and Soviet Empire, from 1989 to 2001; and the post -9/11
terrorist attacks, from 2001-2014.
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Cold War Islamic Berlin Wall Post 9/11
Revolution
Figure 9 shows that during the Cold War and decolonization
period, more conflicts were of an international character than non-
international, and beginning in the Islamic Revolution period, the
majority of all conflicts were internal. In the Cold War period,
there were 21 NIACs and 25 IACs, of which 9 were MM IACs,
making 45.65 percent of all conflicts NIACs and more than half of
the conflicts during that time (54.35 percent) IACs, of which more
than one third, 36 percent, was between Muslim states. In the
Islamic Revolution period in which there were 10 NIACs and 9
IACs, including 5 between Muslim states, NIACs made up 52.63
percent of conflicts while total IACs accounted for 47.37 percent
and IACs between Muslim states made up 26.32 percent of all
IACs. In the Berlin Wall period, 22 NIACs, 70.97 percent, and 9
IACs, 29.03 percent occurred, with 6 of the IACs, 19.36 percent,
occurring between Muslim states. In the post-9/11 period, 17 of
the total 25 conflicts were NIACs (68 percent) and 8 conflicts
were IACs (32 percent), of which only 2 were exclusively between
Muslim state belligerents (8 percent). The data shows that in
general, IACs have declined, as have IACs involving exclusively
Muslim state belligerents. Conversely, NIACs have increased in
the same period.
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D. Compliance and Variation
As part of the MSACC dataset, each Muslim state's
compliance record with international humanitarian law for every
conflict was studied, and instances of IHL violations of core norms
were documented. For this related data, each conflict is recorded
under each state participating in the conflict as a belligerent:
totaling 151 conflicts with 70 NIACs, 81 IACs, and 42 IACs
exclusively between Muslim states. Upon analysis for trends in
compliance with IHL across regions, temporal periods, and
conflict types, one overarching conclusion can be drawn: a state in
an armed conflict is more likely to violate than to comply with
IHL. Table 3, below, details the compliance data of MSACC
broken down by region and conflict type.
In Africa and the Middle East regions, states complied with
IHL in the cases of IACs one and a half times as more than they
violated IHL. By contrast, in Asia, two thirds more states
involved in IACs violated IHL than those that complied.
Likewise, in Europe the sole IAC within the region showed
violations in IHL by at least one state party, and in the Americas
no IACs were recorded in the data. In IACs that were exclusively
between Muslim state belligerents, over two times as many IACs
in Africa and one and a half times as many in the Middle East
showed states in compliance with IHL as compared to the number
of violators. In Asia, 60 percent of Muslim state only IACs
revealed state compliance with IHL compared to the 40 percent
within the region that violated IHL. There were no Muslim-only
IACs documented in the MSACC data in the Americas or Europe.
In direct contrast to the trend of IACs favoring compliance
with IHL, NIACs show the exact opposite. State actors in
intrastate wars, no matter what region, are highly likely to violate
IHL. In three regions, the Americas, Asia, and Europe, all states
involved in NIACs violated IHL. In the Middle East, state
belligerents in NIACs violated IHL 80 percent of the time, and in
Africa, 89 percent of NIACs revealed state violations of IHL.
Overall, Muslim states in Africa and the Middle East were far
more likely to comply with IHL in interstate wars than to violate
IHL in interstate wars. However, in those same regions, Africa
and the Middle East, violations of IHL by states occurred at 80 to
89 percent in intrastate wars. Also, the Middle East had the
highest likelihood of compliance with IHL, 46 percent, followed
by Africa, at 33 percent.
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Table 3: MSACCIHL Compliance by Region
Africa America Asia Europe Middle
East
Compliance V C V V C V V C
IAC 10 17 0 6 4 1 15 22
NIAC 32 4 1 10 0 1 16 4
5 11 0 2 3 0 8 12
42 21 1 16 4 2 31 26
67% 33% 100% 80% 20% 100% 54% 46%
VI. Conclusion:
Scholars, policy analysts, and other commentators in the public
domain have long argued that Muslim states are conflict-prone.20 3
The MSACC data indicates both spatial and temporal variation
among Muslim states in their conflict behavior: some Muslim
states are, indeed, more likely to engage in armed conflicts than
others (i.e., Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Uganda, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia,
Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan, Nigeria, and Chad);
yet, several states, approximately 18 percent, as our data shows,
were not involved in any armed conflict over the course of a sixty
year period. Likewise, certain regions-notably, the Americas and
Europe-had very small incidents of armed conflict by Muslim
states, and even in higher conflict regions and among conflict-
prone states, there are periods in which Muslim states are less
likely to engage in wars: for instance, between 1979 and 1988 and
again in the post 9/11 period. This last finding is consistent with
recent work and provides an empirical basis to further explore
variation among Muslim states in related inquiry. 204 Moreover,
though empirical conflict studies have advanced our understanding
203 See Indra de Soysa & Ragnhild Nordas, Islam's Bloody Innards? Religion and
Political Terror, 1980-2000, 51 INT'L STUD. Q. 927 (2007) (using a culturalist approach
to evaluate the role of Islam in political outcomes); Tusicisny, supra note 4, at 485
(noting that "the majority of intercivilizational conflict-years during the post-Cold War
period have involved Islamic groups").
204 Erik A. Gartzke & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Identity and Conflict: Ties that
Bind and Differences that Divide, 12 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 53 (2006) (critiquing an ex post
facto analysis of the role of culture in conflict); see also Tusicisny, supra note 4
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of interstate and intrastate wars, too little inquiry has contemplated
the potential contribution of international humanitarian law criteria
to this inquiry. It is here, by introducing a new legal definition of
armed conflict into quantitative conflict inquiry, that we hope to
provide a rigorous and fresh perspective on understanding political
violence across Muslim states.
